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The Fourth Amendment: Internal Revenue 
Code or Body of Principles? 
Stephen A. Saltzburg* 
Introduction 
 It is difficult to be certain when the Supreme Court made the body of 
Fourth Amendment law so complicated, inconsistent, and confusing that 
neither police nor citizens can be sure they understand the reach of and 
limits on law enforcement action.  Although there were inconsistent 
decisions before the Supreme Court decided Mapp v. Ohio1 in 1961, Mapp 
represented a watershed moment for the Court and may have had as great 
an impact on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as any case before or since. 
 Prior to that decision the Court focused its attention on federal law 
enforcement and devoted less of its docket to criminal procedure cases than 
it does today.2  Once it decided Mapp and was called upon to review state 
cases developing throughout the country, the Court was forced to deal with 
the myriad of state law enforcement issues that inevitably arise when law 
enforcement officers deal with a range of offenses as minor as traffic 
violations and as major as homicide.  Mapp also meant that when the Court 
upheld a Fourth Amendment claim and found that the police violated the 
Constitution, evidence would to some extent3 become unavailable.  Thus, 
 
 * Wallace and Beverley Woodbury University Professor of Law, The George 
Washington University Law School; A.B., 1967, Dickinson College; J.D., 1970, University 
of Pennsylvania. 
 1 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (creating an exclusionary rule making 
inadmissible in state courts all evidence obtained by unconstitutional searches and seizures).  
Although the Court had held years earlier in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949), that 
the substance of the Fourth Amendment (i.e., the security of one’s privacy against arbitrary 
intrusion by the police) was part of due process protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, 
the absence of an exclusionary rule meant that the Court did not have to worry that its 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment would result in a federally mandated loss of 
evidence in state cases, which constituted the vast bulk of criminal cases in the United 
States. 
 2 For the first one hundred years, the Fourth Amendment was rarely litigated in the 
Supreme Court, which is not surprising given that federal criminal jurisdiction was limited.  
NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 106 (1937). 
 3 The Court has created numerous exceptions to or limitations on the exclusionary 
rule.  These make it impossible to know exactly what the result of suppression of evidence 
will be.  For example, not all suspects have “standing” to complain about Fourth 
Amendment violations.  See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133–34 (1978) (holding 
that Fourth Amendment rights are personal, and only one whose rights are violated can 
complain).  Another example is the “independent source doctrine.”  See, e.g., Murray v. 
United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988) (holding that evidence obtained unlawfully will not 
be excluded if later obtained by independent legitimate means).  The exclusionary rule, with 
all of its limitations, is itself an example of how the Fourth Amendment resembles an 
intricate code. 
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the Court knew that every Fourth Amendment rule would set a standard for 
federal4 and state law enforcement officers and thereby control law 
enforcement, but could also exact a price from society by letting a 
defendant who was in fact guilty, possibly of a serious crime, and others 
who were similarly situated go free.  It would hardly be surprising, 
therefore, for the Court to feel torn as it rendered Fourth Amendment 
decisions, wanting to make Fourth Amendment protections meaningful but 
not wanting guilty defendants to go free as a result of law enforcement 
errors. 
 Whether it was this tension that led the Court to decide cases in an 
erratic way only the Justices can know, and even they might not be certain 
as to why particular rules or applications of rules were approved.  Whatever 
the reason, there can be no doubt that for much of the forty-five years since 
the Mapp decision, the Court has made the meaning of the relatively few 
words that constitute the Fourth Amendment extremely complicated.  The 
Court has created so many rules and subrules that the total body of Fourth 
Amendment law has begun to take on the shape of an Internal Revenue 
Code (a hodgepodge of rules enacted by ever-shifting coalitions of decision 
makers) rather than a body of coherent principles (of the type often 
associated with judicial decisions and reasoning).5 
 The Court itself has noticed the complexity of its work.  From time to 
time, it has adopted “bright line” rules in an effort to provide some clarity 
amidst a jumble of confusion.6  As it turns out, these bright line rules 
generally are announcements of an expanded police power that rests on 
judicial fiat rather than reason.  The Court’s bright line rules run in one 
direction: they favor the police and disfavor claims of individual rights.  
But the problem with the bright-line-rule cases is not that they are 
unidirectional; the problem is that bright line rules are generally 
unprincipled and, for that reason, tend in the long run to make Fourth 
 
 4 An exclusionary rule governed federal law enforcement officers beginning with 
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914). 
 5 A 2002 analysis of Supreme Court cases by the Congressional Research Service of 
the Library of Congress concluded that “[e]xceptions to the warrant requirement are no 
longer evaluated solely by the justifications for the exception, e.g., exigent circumstances, 
and the scope of the search is no longer tied to and limited by the justification for the 
exception.”  CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF CONG., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA—ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION: ANALYSIS OF CASES DECIDED BY THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES TO JUNE 28, 2002, S. DOC NO. 108-17, at 1291 
(2004). 
 6 See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 462–63 (1981) (establishing a “bright 
line” rule permitting the search of the passenger compartment of a car incident to arrest).  
The Court maintains that it does not prefer bright line rules.  See, e.g., Ohio v. Robinette, 
519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (“[W]e have consistently eschewed bright-line rules, instead 
emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness inquiry.”).  The discussion that 
follows will demonstrate, however, that the Court often adopts arbitrary lines in an effort to 
provide guidance to law enforcement officers. 
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Amendment doctrine arbitrary, inconsistent, and confusing. 
 The alternative to bright line rules is a body of principles that capture 
the essence of the Fourth Amendment.  It is amazing that, after more than 
two hundred years of experience with the Fourth Amendment, more than 
ninety years with an exclusionary rule covering federal cases, and almost a 
half century with an exclusionary rule covering all cases, the Supreme 
Court has articulated only one fundamental Fourth Amendment principle—
i.e., warrantless searches generally are per se unreasonable7—that is subject 
to so many exceptions and applies so relatively infrequently that it is a 
principle honored more in the breach than in the observance.8 
 In this article, I offer examples of the unsatisfactory present state of the 
law.  I also suggest alternatives to the Court’s holdings, seek to 
demonstrate why principled rules provide clearer guidance to law 
enforcement and citizens than arbitrary “bright line” rules, and explain how 
principled rules can enable law enforcement to do its work effectively 
while being true to basic Fourth Amendment values. 
 There are many examples that could be used to support the argument I 
make, and I have chosen those that make the case clearly and powerfully.  I 
begin with the automobile exception to the warrant requirement of the 
Fourth Amendment, explain its history and the paucity of support upon 
which the Court relied in creating the exception, show how it is 
unprincipled and inconsistent with other cases the Court has decided, and 
demonstrate that the exception has led the Court to decide a number of 
cases in an arbitrary and inconsistent way.  The sheer length of the 
discussion of the automobile exception cases is testament to the complexity 
and confusion it has generated.  Although this is not an article about 
automobiles, after discussion of the automobile exception, I turn to the 
search-incident-to-arrest doctrine and, in part, focus on the special rules the 
Court created when it applied the doctrine to searches of persons arrested in 
 
 7 The Court has said that “searches conducted outside the judicial process, without 
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated 
exceptions.”  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
 8 Justice Scalia made this point in his concurring opinion in California v. Acevedo, 
500 U.S. 565 (1991): 
Even before today’s decision, the “warrant requirement” had become so riddled 
with exceptions that it was basically unrecognizable.  In 1985, one commentator 
cataloged nearly 20 such exceptions, including “searches incident to arrest . . . 
automobile searches . . . border searches . . . administrative searches of regulated 
businesses . . . exigent circumstances . . . search[es] incident to nonarrest when 
there is probable cause to arrest . . . boat boarding for document checks . . . welfare 
searches . . . inventory searches . . . airport searches . . . school search[es] . . . .”  
Since then, we have added at least two more [exceptions, including] searches of 
mobile homes [and] searches of offices of government employees. 
Id. at 582–83 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (first two alterations in original) 
(citations omitted). 
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or near cars.  The discussion of the doctrine illustrates the difference 
between adopting a principled approach, which the Court did at one time, 
and abandoning such an approach in favor of arbitrary, inconsistent, “bright 
line” rules. 
 After demonstrating the problems associated with the Court’s arbitrary 
and inconsistent decisions, I identify some basic principles that should 
guide the Court in interpreting the Fourth Amendment.  First, I explain the 
importance of determining whether law enforcement officials are engaging 
in consensual or nonconsensual conduct.  Second, I discuss seizures and 
Terry stops and offer suggestions on adopting principles that would make it 
easier for both law enforcement officers and citizens to know when a 
seizure occurs.  In this section, I argue that it makes more sense to focus on 
police conduct rather than to require police to intuit what reasonable 
individuals think about police conduct.  A focus on police conduct leads to 
the conclusion that a number of Supreme Court decisions provide less 
Fourth Amendment protection than they should provide.  The discussion of 
seizures covers seizures of both individuals and property. 
 Third, I address what I regard as one of the most important, and sure to 
be one of the most controversial, suggestions for reform of Fourth 
Amendment law.  I do this in a discussion of arrests, where I claim that the 
Court has failed to adequately consider the unreasonableness of many 
arrests for minor offenses.  I discuss the reasons why law enforcement 
officers arrest suspects, offer a principled approach to limit the number of 
future arrests, and suggest an improvement on the Court’s approach to 
warrants as a prerequisite to arrest. 
 Fourth, I conclude with three straightforward suggestions for making 
the law of searches clearer and more principled.  One deals with search 
incident to arrest.  The other two address searches of property and the 
requirement of a warrant.  The three suggestions would give the Warrant 
Clause of the Fourth Amendment the deference the Court claims it 
deserves, provide better guidance for law enforcement officers, and replace 
arbitrary rules with principled ones. 
 This article makes no claim that the Rehnquist Court was the sole or 
even the principal cause of Fourth Amendment law’s arbitrariness and 
complexity.  The problems with Fourth Amendment doctrine are eighty 
years old, have grown over time, and have largely been ignored by both the 
predecessors to the Rehnquist Court and the Rehnquist Court itself.  Fourth 
Amendment law was complex, inconsistent, and confusing before Chief 
Justice Rehnquist led the Court.9  But the Rehnquist Court missed 
 
 9 Some of the confusion was generated while Chief Justice Rehnquist was an 
Associate Justice.  Chief Justice Rehnquist was part of the Court’s decision making for three 
quarters of the post-Mapp period, as Associate Justice from 1972 to1985, and thereafter as 
Chief Justice. 
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opportunities to correct the problems that it inherited and even exacerbated 
some of them as it continued down the path of the Warren and Burger 
Courts and their predecessors.  With the Roberts Court now underway, the 
problems will continue unless the Court is willing to take a fresh look at the 
complex Internal Revenue–type law it has created. 
I. The Automobile Exception to the Fourth Amendment 
 Given that Americans love their cars, love to drive, and use their cars 
for a variety of tasks,10 it is surprising how the Supreme Court has dealt 
with automobiles in Fourth Amendment cases.  It is fair to say that there is 
more bad law involving the automobile than any other single item, with the 
possible exception of narcotics.11 
A. Carroll v. United States 
 The Court’s first major automobile case was Carroll v. United States.12  
Federal prohibition agents stopped a car with two occupants driving 
westward on a highway between Detroit and Grand Rapids.13  The agents 
had unexpectedly encountered the suspects and suspected that they were 
carrying illegal liquor.14  After stopping the car, they searched it.15  Chief 
Justice Taft’s opinion for the Court laid out the legislative history of the 
federal prohibition statute authorizing the search and seizure of the vehicle, 
which read as follows: 
“When the commissioner, his assistants, inspectors, or any officer 
of the law shall discover any person in the act of transporting in 
violation of the law, intoxicating liquors in any wagon, buggy, 
automobile, water or air craft, or other vehicle, it shall be his duty 
to seize any and all intoxicating liquors found therein being 
transported contrary to law.  Whenever intoxicating liquors 
transported or possessed illegally shall be seized by an officer he 
shall take possession of the vehicle and team or automobile, boat, 
air or water craft, or any other conveyance, and shall arrest any 
person in charge thereof.”16 
 
 10 Former Virginia Attorney General Mary Sue Terry came from a Virginia town that 
was so small that, as she so aptly put it, “‘[O]ur high school taught sex education and driver 
ed in the same car.’”  Patricia Edmonds, Walking Fine Line in Feud, USA TODAY, June 21, 
1991, at 2A. 
 11 See generally Stephen A. Saltzburg, Another Victim of Illegal Narcotics: The 
Fourth Amendment (as Illustrated by the Open Fields Doctrine), 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 
(1986). 
 12 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
 13 Id. at 135. 
 14 Id. at 135–36. 
 15 Id. at 136. 
 16 Id. at 144 (quoting National Prohibition Act § 26, 41 Stat. 305, 315–16 (1919)).  
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 The statute required the federal officers to seize any intoxicating 
liquors found in a vehicle and to take possession of the vehicle itself.17  
Although the statute did not specifically address searches of the vehicle, it 
is fair to assume that even if officials came upon illegal liquor in plain 
view, they would want to search the vehicle to assure that they seized all of 
the liquor concealed therein.  Since they were authorized to seize the 
vehicle because it contained contraband, any search would have been of a 
vehicle in which the government had a possessory right.18  The Court 
claimed to be relying on early statutes that authorized warrantless searches.  
It quoted from section 24 of the Act of 1789, which provided: 
“That every collector, naval officer and surveyor, or other person 
specially appointed by either of them for that purpose, shall have 
full power and authority, to enter any ship or vessel, in which they 
shall have reason to suspect any goods, wares or merchandise 
subject to duty shall be concealed; and therein to search for, seize, 
and secure any such goods, wares or merchandise; and if they 
shall have cause to suspect a concealment thereof, in any 
particular dwelling house, store, building, or other place, they or 
either of them shall, upon application on oath or affirmation to any 
justice of the peace, be entitled to a warrant to enter such house, 
store, or other place (in the day time only) and there to search for 
such goods . . . .”19 
 
The Court in Carroll noted that the First Judiciary Act and other early federal statutes 
empowered officers to board and search vessels when they had reason to suspect the vessels 
were concealing items subject to duty.  Id. at 150–51.  The Court explained that there was  
a difference made as to the necessity for a search warrant between goods subject to 
forfeiture, when concealed in a dwelling house or similar place, and like goods in 
course of transportation and concealed in a movable vessel where they readily 
could be put out of reach of a search warrant.   
Id. at 151.  None of the statutes cited by the Court dealt with movable property or forms of 
transport other than vessels. 
 17 National Prohibition Act § 26, 41 Stat. 305, 315–16 (1919). 
 18 The government also claimed a possessory right to the liquor.  Title II, section 25 of 
the National Prohibition Act was enacted to enforce the Eighteenth Amendment.  The 
statute made it unlawful to have or possess any liquor and provided that no property rights 
existed in such liquor.  Id. § 25.  The statute restricted searches of homes even with warrants 
but permitted warrants to issue to search places of business: 
No search warrant shall issue to search any private dwelling occupied as such 
unless it is being used for the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor, or unless it is in 
part used for some business purpose such as a store, shop, saloon, restaurant, hotel, 
or boarding house.  The term ‘private dwelling’ shall be construed to include the 
room or rooms used and occupied not transiently but solely as a residence in an 
apartment house, hotel, or boarding house. 
Id.  Upon conviction of the person from whom the liquor was seized, the liquor was to 
be destroyed and the property (e.g., a car) was to be sold with the proceeds going to the 
government.  Id. §§ 25–26. 
 19 Carroll, 267 U.S. at 150–51 (quoting Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 29, 
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The Court further noted that three subsequent acts passed shortly after the 
Act of 1789 contained similar provisions.20  It is clear, however, that each 
of the statutes cited permitted only warrantless searches of ships and 
vessels and required warrants for searches of any “other place.”21  A search 
of a coach, saddlebags, or other property that was mobile would be a search 
for things in various “other places,” and would have required a warrant.  
The Court ignored the precise language of the statutes in its conclusion: 
 We have made a somewhat extended reference to these statutes 
to show that the guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches 
and seizures by the Fourth Amendment has been construed, 
practically since the beginning of the Government, as recognizing 
a necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling house 
or other structure[22] in respect of which a proper official warrant 
readily may be obtained, and a search of a ship, motor boat, 
wagon or automobile, for contraband goods,[23] where it is not 
practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly 
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must 
be sought.24 
 Furthermore, the Court found that legislative history of the federal 
 
43). 
 20 Id. at 151.  The three statutes mentioned by the Court are as follows: Act of Aug. 4, 
1790, ch. 35, §§ 48–51, 1 Stat. 145, 170; Act of Feb. 18, 1793, ch. 8, § 27, 1 Stat. 305, 315; 
Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 22, §§ 68–71, 1 Stat. 627, 677–78. 
 21 See Act of Aug. 4, 1790 § 48; Act of Feb. 18, 1793 § 27; Act of Mar. 2, 1799 § 68. 
 22 The Court substituted the word “structure” for the word “place” in the statutes.  
This makes a big difference.  See, e.g., Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 24, 1 Stat. 29, 43. 
 23 The Court made things somewhat easier for itself by suggesting that from the early 
days of the Republic, movable vehicles could be searched without a warrant.  In fact, there 
were no motor boats or automobiles, and no early statute addressed them.  Ships were a 
special case because it was almost impossible to envision magistrates being available when 
agents stopped a ship on the water.  What about wagons?  They existed in 1791 and were 
capable of carrying all kinds of private property.  Were they always subject to search 
without warrants?  What about a person riding a horse?  Was anyone who was in motion 
subject to search without warrants?  The Court suggested that the statutes authorized such 
searches, but quoted language that only addressed vessels. 
  Even though the language of the early statutes required a warrant to search for 
items in any place except in ships and vessels, in later decisions the Court simply cited its 
Carroll version of the statutes without looking back to their actual language.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 805–06 (1982). 
  It is clear that prior to the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, the Framers of the 
Constitution were concerned about searches of “boxes chests & trunks” as well as homes.  
LEONARD W. LEVY, SEASONED JUDGMENTS: THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, RIGHTS, AND 
HISTORY 160 (1995) (quotation omitted).  Were they only concerned about these items when 
contained in houses?  There is evidence that the Framers were concerned about searches of 
“possessions” and “places” as well as searches of homes.  LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL 
INTENT AND THE FRAMERS’ CONSTITUTION 237 (1988) (citation omitted). 
 24 Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153. 
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prohibition statute indicated that Congress intended to authorize 
warrantless searches for automobiles and other road vehicles.25  It is 
questionable whether this conclusion is correct.  The Court demonstrated 
that Congress ultimately enacted a law that made it a misdemeanor for any 
officer seeking to enforce prohibition “without a search warrant [to] 
maliciously and without reasonable cause search any other building or 
property . . . .”26  The Court reasoned that this meant that officers were free 
to search automobiles and other property other than homes without 
warrants.27  This may be a stretch.  Congress’s decision to make it a crime 
to search without a warrant only when the officer acted maliciously and 
without reasonable cause did not necessarily mean that Congress thought 
all warrantless activity was constitutional.  Congress might have wanted to 
criminalize the worst warrantless conduct and leave ordinary warrantless 
conduct to the courts to enforce through the exclusionary rule.  The House 
Report expressed a desire to permit warrantless searches of automobiles,28 
in contravention of the Senate’s proposed statute.  The Conference Report 
adopted the language quoted above without explanation.29 
 Of course, there was no Terry v. Ohio30 at the time Carroll was 
decided, and neither Congress nor the Court had occasion to consider 
whether it was reasonable to search a vehicle without a warrant if it were 
possible instead to seize the vehicle while a warrant was obtained.  The 
Carroll Court simply never addressed whether a ship, automobile, or other 
transportation vehicle is so mobile as to make it “not practicable to secure a 
warrant” if law enforcement officers have the power and ability to seize it 
while a warrant is sought. 
 It also should be noted that the Court’s emphasis was on contraband, 
which no party had a right to possess.  At the time, the government could 
not search for “mere evidence,” with or without a warrant.31  This greatly 
limited the government’s ability to search. 
 One of the overlooked parts of Carroll is this phrase: “In cases where 
the securing of a warrant is reasonably practicable, it must be used . . . .”32  
 
 25 Id. at 147. 
 26 Act Supplemental to the National Prohibition Act § 6, 42 Stat. 222, 223–24 (1921). 
 27 Carroll, 267 U.S. at 147. 
 28 See H.R. REP. NO. 67-344, at 3 (1921). 
 29 See H.R. REP. NO. 67-361, at 1 (1921) (Conf. Rep.). 
 30 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (holding that a restricted search by a police officer 
for the officer’s protection does not require a warrant in reasonable and dangerous 
circumstances). 
 31 See Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309–311 (1921) (holding that papers 
possessing evidentiary value, but no pecuniary value, may not be taken under search 
warrants). 
 32 Carroll, 267 U.S. at 156.  Not long after Carroll was decided, some writers 
concluded that it was a limited decision resting on the fact that it was impractical to obtain a 
warrant on the facts presented: 
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This language makes Carroll something of a puzzle.  The Court sustained 
the power conferred by Congress to engage in warrantless searches by 
reasoning that it was impractical to obtain a warrant, but asserted that a 
warrant must be used where it was reasonably practical to obtain one.33  
The controlling assumption is that warrantless searches of vehicles are 
always impractical. 
 Without knowing the general availability of magistrates and of 
resources available to law enforcement for seizing and storing vehicles, it is 
impossible to assess how reasonable the Court’s assumption was in 1925.  
It is plausible to assume that limited manpower, communications, and 
magistrate availability supported the notion that it was generally or 
typically impractical to obtain a warrant to search automobiles.  The 
plausibility increases if one assumes that the Court operated on the 
assumption that it was all or nothing: no seizure or search unless there was 
a warrant, or seizure and search without a warrant.34 
B. Terry v. Ohio 
 Seven years after it decided Mapp, the Supreme Court recognized in 
Terry v. Ohio35 the right of law enforcement officers to engage in “stop and 
frisks” and thus gave its approval to one of the most important tools 
available to law enforcement officers.36  Terry recognized that the Fourth 
Amendment permitted searches and temporary seizures of individuals upon 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and danger while an officer 
 
In the searching of automobiles, then, where as a practical matter it would be 
impossible to procure a warrant in time to effect a search, the same rule applies as 
has always held in the case of vessels; namely, that no warrant but only the 
existence of probable cause is necessary to constitute the search a reasonable one. 
  In an appropriate case, however, where the principal basis for this exception as 
to movable vehicles does not apply, e.g., where the automobile for some reason 
will not be able to be moved or where a vessel, let us say, is firmly beached, and 
there consequently is time to respect the safeguard of a warrant, it is reasonable to 
suppose that upon the ratio decidendi of the automobile cases a warrant might be 
held necessary in such an instance. 
LASSON, supra note 2, at 125–26. 
 33 Carroll, 267 U.S. at 156. 
 34 There is some evidence that the Court made this assumption.  It insisted that the car 
was seized before an arrest was made.  This meant that, even though the offense of 
possessing illegal liquor was a misdemeanor, the crime clearly was in the officer’s presence 
because the seizure and search revealed the liquor.  By reasoning this way, the Court was 
able to defend the warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor by referring to a traditional common 
law power.  Id. at 156–57.  Justice McReynolds dissented and argued that the arrest 
preceded the search and that Congress had not authorized a warrantless arrest under these 
circumstances.  Id. at 163, 166–69 (Reynolds, J., dissenting).  The dissent also challenged 
the probable cause determination by the majority.  Id. at 171–75. 
 35 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 36 Id. at 30–31.  See generally Stephen A. Saltzburg, Terry v. Ohio: A Practically 
Perfect Doctrine, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 911 (1998). 
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decided whether there was probable cause to arrest.37 
 Two years after deciding Terry, the Court recognized that the power to 
detain upon reasonable suspicion applied to property as well as to people.  
In United States v. Van Leeuwen,38 the Court approved of the conduct of 
officers who detained mailed packages for more than a day while they 
investigated and obtained the probable cause they needed to get a warrant 
to search the packages.39  Justice Douglas, the sole dissenter in Terry, wrote 
for a unanimous Court in Van Leeuwen and distinguished between seizing 
the packages and searching them: 
The “protective search for weapons” of a suspect which the Court 
approved in Terry v. Ohio, even when probable cause for an arrest 
did not exist, went further than we need go here.  The only thing 
done here on the basis of suspicion was detention of the packages.  
There was at that point no possible invasion of the right “to be 
secure” in the “persons, houses, papers, and effects” protected by 
the Fourth Amendment against “unreasonable searches and 
seizures.”  Theoretically . . . detention of mail could at some point 
become an unreasonable seizure of “papers” or “effects” within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. . . . 
 No interest protected by the Fourth Amendment was invaded by 
forwarding the packages the following day rather than the day 
when they were deposited.  The significant Fourth Amendment 
interest was in the privacy of this first-class mail; and that privacy 
was not disturbed or invaded until the approval of the magistrate 
was obtained.40 
With Terry and Van Leeuwen on the books, the stage was set for another 
look at searches of automobiles.  It would come in Chambers v. Maroney,41 
shortly after Van Leeuwen was decided.42 
C. Chambers v. Maroney 
 The facts of Chambers are uncomplicated.  Two men with guns robbed 
a gas station.43  Two teenagers saw a station wagon speed away from the 
gas station, learned the station had been robbed, and reported a description 
 
 37 The Terry standard is now clearly established as reasonable suspicion, although that 
was not true when the case was decided.  Saltzburg, supra note 36, at 949. 
 38 United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970). 
 39 Id. at 253. 
 40 Id. at 252–53 (citation omitted). 
 41 Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). 
 42 The cases were heard during the same Term.  Van Leeuwen was argued on 
February 25, 1970, and decided on March 23, 1970.  Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. at 249.  
Chambers was argued on April 27, 1970, and decided on June 22, 1970.  Chambers, 399 
U.S. at 42. 
 43 Chambers, 399 U.S. at 44. 
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of what they had seen to the police.44  The police broadcast a description of 
the car and the two robbers over the police radio.45  Within an hour, officers 
spotted a station wagon meeting the description.46  They arrested the 
occupants47 and drove the station wagon to the police station, where they 
searched it without a warrant and found evidence used to convict 
Chambers.48 
 The issue before the Court was whether the warrantless search was 
reasonable.49  Justice White’s majority opinion, relying on Carroll, held 
that it was.50  The majority, however, failed completely to discuss the 
language from Carroll quoted above: “In cases where the securing of a 
warrant is reasonably practicable, it must be used . . . .”51  The Court also 
drew no distinction between the fact patterns of the two cases: Carroll was 
a search and seizure of contraband52 while Chambers was a search and 
seizure of both contraband and evidence.  Justice White cited several post-
Carroll cases that added little to the Carroll analysis.53  He purported to 
recognize that not all warrantless searches of automobiles are reasonable, 
and then set forth the alternative options available to the police: 
 Neither Carroll nor other cases in this Court require or suggest 
that in every conceivable circumstance the search of an auto even 
with probable cause may be made without the extra protection for 
privacy that a warrant affords.  But the circumstances that furnish 
probable cause to search a particular auto for particular articles are 
most often unforeseeable; moreover, the opportunity to search is 
fleeting since a car is readily movable.  Where this is true, as in 
Carroll and the case before us now, if an effective search is to be 
made at any time, either the search must be made immediately 
without a warrant or the car itself must be seized and held without 
a warrant for whatever period is necessary to obtain a warrant for 
 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Although there were two robbers with guns, the teenagers reported that the station 
wagon contained four men.  When the police stopped the car, it contained four men.  Id. 
 48 Id. at 43–45. 
 49 Id. at 46–47. 
 50 Id. at 51–52. 
 51 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925). 
 52 Justice Harlan’s opinion in Chambers, concurring in part and dissenting in part, 
pointed out that all prior holdings of the Court regarding warrantless automobile searches 
involved contraband.  Chambers, 399 U.S. at 62 n.7 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 53 Id. at 49 (majority opinion) (citing Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931) 
(warrantless search of automobile for liquor); Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938) 
(warrantless search of trunk of automobile for liquor); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 
160 (1949) (warrantless search of automobile for liquor)). 
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the search.54 
Justice White then summarized the holding in Carroll: 
Only in exigent circumstances will the judgment of the police as 
to probable cause serve as a sufficient authorization for a search.  
Carroll holds a search warrant unnecessary where there is 
probable cause to search an automobile stopped on the highway; 
the car is movable, the occupants are alerted, and the car’s 
contents may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained.  
Hence an immediate search is constitutionally permissible.55 
Justice White then confronted the issue not considered in Carroll: 
 Arguably, because of the preference for a magistrate’s 
judgment, only the immobilization of the car should be permitted 
until a search warrant is obtained; arguably, only the “lesser” 
intrusion is permissible until the magistrate authorizes the 
“greater.”  But which is the “greater” and which the “lesser” 
intrusion is itself a debatable question and the answer may depend 
on a variety of circumstances.  For constitutional purposes, we see 
no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a car 
before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on 
the other hand carrying out an immediate search without a 
warrant.  Given probable cause to search, either course is 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 
 On the facts before us, the blue station wagon could have been 
searched on the spot when it was stopped since there was probable 
cause to search and it was a fleeting target for a search.  The 
probable-cause factor still obtained at the station house and so did 
the mobility of the car unless the Fourth Amendment permits a 
warrantless seizure of the car and the denial of its use to anyone 
until a warrant is secured.  In that event there is little to choose in 
terms of practical consequences between an immediate search 
without a warrant and the car’s immobilization until a warrant is 
obtained.56 
 The most striking thing about this reasoning (or lack thereof) is the 
complete failure to recognize what the Court unanimously held three 
months earlier in Van Leeuwen: there is a tremendous difference between 
seizing an object while securing a warrant and searching the contents of the 
object.57  Almost equally striking is the Court’s suggestion that the station 
wagon was still mobile after the police stopped it, arrested the occupants, 
 
 54 Id. at 50–51 (citation omitted). 
 55 Id. at 51 (citation omitted). 
 56 Id. at 51–52 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 
 57 See United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 252–53 (1970). 
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and took control of the vehicle.58  The facts clearly demonstrate that not 
only could the police render the vehicle immobile to all but themselves, but 
they could (and did) remove the vehicle to a location under their control. 
 Justice Harlan responded to Justice White: 
 The Court concedes that the police could prevent removal of the 
evidence by temporarily seizing the car for the time necessary to 
obtain a warrant.  It does not dispute that such a course would 
fully protect the interests of effective law enforcement; rather it 
states that whether temporary seizure is a “lesser” intrusion than 
warrantless search is itself a debatable question and the answer 
may depend on a variety of circumstances.  I believe it clear that a 
warrantless search involves the greater sacrifice of Fourth 
Amendment values. 
 The Fourth Amendment proscribes, to be sure, unreasonable 
“seizures” as well as “searches.”  However, in the circumstances 
in which this problem is likely to occur, the lesser intrusion will 
almost always be the simple seizure of the car for the period—
perhaps a day—necessary to enable the officers to obtain a search 
warrant.  In the first place, as this case shows, the very facts 
establishing probable cause to search will often also justify arrest 
of the occupants of the vehicle.  Since the occupants themselves 
are to be taken into custody, they will suffer minimal further 
inconvenience from the temporary immobilization of their vehicle.  
Even where no arrests are made, persons who wish to avoid a 
search—either to protect their privacy or to conceal incriminating 
evidence—will almost certainly prefer a brief loss of the use of 
the vehicle in exchange for the opportunity to have a magistrate 
pass upon the justification for the search.  To be sure, one can 
conceive of instances in which the occupant, having nothing to 
hide and lacking concern for the privacy of the automobile, would 
be more deeply offended by a temporary immobilization of his 
vehicle than by a prompt search of it.  However, such a person 
always remains free to consent to an immediate search, thus 
avoiding any delay.  Where consent is not forthcoming, the 
occupants of the car have an interest in privacy that is protected by 
the Fourth Amendment even where the circumstances justify a 
temporary seizure.59 
Justice Harlan cited Terry, but he ignored the more recent and more 
relevant decision in Van Leeuwen.60  The most powerful line in his opinion 
 
 58 See Chambers, 399 U.S. at 52. 
 59 Id. at 63–64 (quotation omitted) (citations omitted) (Harlan, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
 60 See Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. at 252–53. 
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is relegated to a footnote: “The Court, unable to decide whether search or 
temporary seizure is the ‘lesser’ intrusion, in this case authorizes both.”61  
Justice Harlan was charitable to the majority, for his footnote makes clear 
that the majority did not realize that one plus one equals two, and that two 
is a larger number than one.  A seizure is one intrusion, while a search is 
another.  The two together amount to one intrusion greater than a seizure 
standing alone. 
D. Houses That Are Automobiles 
 Carroll distinguished between a “dwelling house or other structure in 
respect of which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained, and a 
search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile . . . .”62  The question 
that was bound to arise was whether a home that had wheels was a 
dwelling house or an automobile for Fourth Amendment purposes.  In the 
final year of the Burger Court, the Supreme Court answered this question in 
California v. Carney.63 
 Carney’s motor home was under surveillance by drug enforcement 
agents when a young man entered, stayed a while, and left.64  The agents 
confronted him and learned that he had received marijuana from Carney in 
exchange for sex.65  The agents prevailed upon the young man to return to 
the motor home and knock on its door.66  When Carney stepped out, the 
agents identified themselves and, “[w]ithout a warrant or consent, one 
agent entered the motor home and observed marijuana, plastic bags, and a 
scale of the kind used in weighing drugs on a table.”67  The agents arrested 
Carney and took possession of the motor home.68  “A subsequent search of 
the motor home at the police station revealed additional marijuana in the 
cupboards and refrigerator.”69  Both searches of the motor home were 
warrantless.70 
 Perhaps realizing that a motor home is not as easily moved as a regular 
car, the Court noted that mobility was not the only justification for the 
Carroll rule.71  The Court emphasized that there is a lesser expectation of 
privacy in cars than in other places.72  Ultimately, the Court concluded that 
 
 61 Chambers, 399 U.S. at 63 n.8 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 62 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925). 
 63 California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985). 
 64 Id. at 388. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. at 391. 
 72 Id. at 392. 
  
2006] The Fourth Amendment: Code or Body of Principles? 1715 
motor homes are sufficiently mobile to be treated as automobiles even 
though people live in them.73  It left open, however, the question of whether 
a mobile home could be treated as an automobile if there were objective 
indications that it was being used as a residence and not for 
transportation.74 
 The Court ignored, as it did in Chambers, the fact that the police took 
possession of the motor home, transported it to the police station, 
controlled it exclusively, and made certain that they controlled its 
movement.  Once the agents seized the motor home, it was no more mobile 
for Carney than the station wagon was for Chambers after the police seized 
it.75 
E. Property in Automobiles Prior to the Rehnquist Court 
 Because of the bankrupt state of the mobility doctrine and the 
difficulty after Terry and Van Leeuwen of justifying a warrantless search of 
property (where a seizure pending the obtaining of a warrant is 
practicable), it is not surprising that the arbitrariness of the automobile 
exception has led to inconsistent and confusing decisions.  This happened 
as the Court addressed moveable property in cars. 
 Because cars are mobile, it obviously follows that items that can fit 
into cars are also mobile.  Indeed, any object that is capable of fitting into a 
vehicle is as mobile as the vehicle itself.  Should this mean that government 
agents should be able to seize and search any such item without a warrant? 
 The Court said “no” in United States v. Chadwick.76  Amtrak railroad 
officials in San Diego became suspicious of a footlocker that was loaded 
onto a train heading for Boston.77  When the train arrived in Boston, federal 
agents were waiting.78  The two men who had brought the footlocker from 
San Diego met Chadwick at the station, and with the help of an attendant, 
lifted the footlocker into the trunk of Chadwick’s waiting car.79  Before the 
trunk closed and the car started, the federal agents arrested Chadwick and 
the two San Diego men.80  The agents took the arrestees and Chadwick’s 
car with the footlocker to the Federal Building in Boston, where they 
conducted a warrantless search of the footlocker and found large quantities 
of marijuana.81 
 The case boiled down to two arguments that are as amusing as they are 
 
 73 Id. at 393–94. 
 74 Id. at 394 n.3. 
 75 See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 43–44 (1970). 
 76 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977). 
 77 Id. at 3. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. at 4. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 4–5. 
  
1716 The George Washington Law Review [Vol. 74:1702 
strange.  The government argued that a footlocker was not a house, and 
therefore a warrant should not be required to search it.82  Chadwick and the 
other defendants argued that the footlocker was not a car, and therefore a 
warrant was required.83  The Supreme Court, using its wisdom and 
experience from its earlier automobile cases, agreed with both parties by 
holding that a footlocker was neither a house nor a car.84  In the end, 
though, the Court concluded that a footlocker in the trunk of a car was 
more like a house than a car.85 
 One bit of Chief Justice Burger’s reasoning was especially memorable: 
“Unlike an automobile, whose primary function is transportation, luggage 
is intended as a repository of personal effects.  In sum, a person’s 
expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in 
an automobile.”86  This is amazing.  Most people who have not been 
trained in Fourth Amendment law, if asked what the purpose of luggage is, 
would reply that it is used for traveling.  After all, what is more mobile than 
luggage?  And how do most people get their luggage from place to place?  
The trip usually begins in a car or taxi, which is how most people transport 
their private and personal effects from one place to another.  Cars are 
vehicles for transporting people and their things, even their most private 
things.  But the Court in Chadwick insisted on treating luggage in cars as 
more worthy than the cars themselves.  Incredibly, the Court concluded that 
people have a greater expectation of privacy in a container that is placed in 
a car than in a container that is part of a car.87  The Court did not explain its 
conclusion, which is not surprising given that it doesn’t really matter 
whether one puts something in the trunk, in the glove compartment, or in a 
bag which is then placed in a car—the effect is still the same. 
 In Arkansas v. Sanders,88 the Court held that a warrant was required to 
search a suitcase that had been placed in the trunk of a taxi.89  The Court 
reasoned that although the police had probable cause to search the suitcase, 
they did not have the authority to search the suitcase absent a warrant 
because it was practicable to keep the suitcase secure in police custody 
while a warrant was sought.90 
 In the Court’s next automobile exception case, Robbins v. California,91 
 
 82 Id. at 7. 
 83 Id. at 12. 
 84 Id. at 12–13. 
 85 Id. at 13. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979). 
 89 Id. at 765. 
 90 Id. at 761, 766. 
 91 Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981) (plurality opinion), overruled by United 
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). 
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California Highway Patrol officers stopped a station wagon driven by 
Robbins because he had been driving erratically.92  Robbins left his car, 
walked towards the patrol car, and fumbled with his wallet when asked for 
his driver’s license and registration.93  When he opened the car door, the 
officers smelled marijuana smoke.94  One officer patted Robbins down and 
discovered a vial of liquid.95  The officer searched the passenger 
compartment and found both marijuana and paraphernalia.96  After the 
officers put Robbins in the patrol car, they opened the tailgate of the station 
wagon where they uncovered a recessed luggage compartment containing a 
tote bag and two packages wrapped in green opaque plastic.97  The police 
unwrapped the packages and found that each contained fifteen pounds of 
marijuana.98 
 The issue before the Court was whether the police could search the 
green opaque plastic packages (i.e., garbage bags) without a warrant.99  
Justice Stewart’s plurality opinion, which relied upon Chadwick and 
Sanders, declined to treat one person’s garbage bags as less worthy of 
protection than another person’s footlocker or suitcase.100  Justice Powell 
concurred only in the judgment and objected to what he regarded as the 
plurality’s “bright line” rule.101  He concluded that “the law of search and 
seizure with respect to automobiles is intolerably confusing.  The Court 
apparently cannot agree even on what it has held previously, let alone on 
how these cases should be decided.”102 
 Then, in United States v. Ross,103 the Court appeared determined to 
eliminate some of the confusion as it upheld the warrantless search of a 
car.104  In Ross, a police informant telephoned a District of Columbia Police 
Department detective and told him that an individual known as “Bandit” 
was selling narcotics kept in the trunk of a car parked at a particular 
location.105  After the informant had observed “Bandit” complete a sale, 
“Bandit” had told him that the trunk contained more narcotics.106  The 
informant gave a detailed description of “Bandit” and stated that the car 
 
 92 Id. at 422. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. at 423. 
 100 Id. at 428. 
 101 Id. at 429, 430 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 102 Id. at 430. 
 103 United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). 
 104 Id. at 800. 
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1718 The George Washington Law Review [Vol. 74:1702 
was a “purplish maroon” Chevrolet Malibu with District of Columbia 
license plates.107  The detective and two other officers immediately drove to 
the area and found a maroon Malibu parked in front of the identified 
location.108  Through a license plate check, they discovered that the car was 
registered to Albert Ross, and a computer check on Ross revealed that he 
used the alias “Bandit” and matched the informant’s description.109 
 The officers initially could not find anyone meeting the description, so 
they left the area to avoid arousing suspicion.110 They returned a few 
minutes later and observed the maroon Malibu being driven.111  They 
pulled alongside the car, noticed that the driver matched the informant’s 
description, pulled the car over, and ordered the driver out of the vehicle.112  
Ross was the driver.113  While the officers searched him, another officer 
searched the car’s interior, discovering a bullet on the car’s front seat and a 
pistol in the glove compartment.114  They arrested Ross, took his keys, 
opened the trunk, found a closed brown paper bag, opened the bag and 
discovered a number of glassine bags containing a white powder later 
determined to be heroin.115  They drove the car to headquarters, searched it 
again, and found in the trunk a zippered red leather pouch with $3200 in 
cash.116 
 Justice Stevens’s opinion for the Court distinguished Chadwick and 
Sanders as cases where probable cause existed to search the containers 
inside the cars, not the vehicles themselves.117  In Ross, however, the 
probable cause existed to search the car itself.118  Justice Stevens explained 
as follows: 
 The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile thus is not 
defined by the nature of the container in which the contraband is 
secreted.  Rather, it is defined by the object of the search and the 
places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be 
found.  Just as probable cause to believe that a stolen lawnmower 
may be found in a garage will not support a warrant to search an 
upstairs bedroom, probable cause to believe that undocumented 
aliens are being transported in a van will not justify a warrantless 
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search of a suitcase.  Probable cause to believe that a container 
placed in the trunk of a taxi contains contraband or evidence does 
not justify a search of the entire cab.119 
 Justice Blackmun, who dissented in the prior cases,120 wrote a 
concurring opinion in which he joined the Court’s opinion because it was 
important “that the applicable legal rules be clearly established.”121  He 
continued, “Justice Stevens’ opinion for the Court now accomplishes much 
in this respect, and it should clarify a good bit of the confusion that has 
existed.”122  Justice Powell also wrote a concurring opinion indicating that 
he agreed that it was important to have clear rules, and that Justice 
Stevens’s opinion reduced the uncertainty in the law and was consistent 
with Carroll and Chambers.123 
 Ironically, Justice Powell’s objection to “bright line” rules disappeared 
when the rules set down permitted rather than restricted searches.  Six 
Justices now seemed to believe that Ross had done the trick by resolving 
the chaos created by prior decisions. 
F. California v. Acevedo 
 The Rehnquist Court cannot be blamed for these automobile decisions.  
Chief Justice Rehnquist was not a member of the Courts that decided 
Carroll and Chambers.  He joined Justice Blackmun’s dissenting opinions 
in Chadwick124 and Sanders,125 and wrote his own dissenting opinion in 
Robbins126 before joining the majority in Ross.  His Robbins dissent 
indicated that he preferred a particular bright line rule: 
[O]ne need not demonstrate that a particular automobile was 
capable of being moved, but that automobiles as a class are 
inherently mobile, and a defendant seeking to suppress evidence 
obtained from an automobile should not be heard to say that this 
particular automobile had broken down, was in a parking lot under 
the supervision of the police, or the like.127 
 
 119 Id. at 824. 
 120 See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 436 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); 
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 768 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); United States v. 
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 17 (1977) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 121 Ross, 456 U.S. at 825 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. at 826 (Powell, J., concurring).  Justice Powell also wrote that Justice Stevens’s 
opinion was consistent with the Court’s decision from the previous Term in New York v. 
Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), which is discussed infra at note 186.  Ross, 456 U.S. at 826 
(Powell, J., concurring) 
 124 See Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 17 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 125 See Sanders, 442 U.S. at 768 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 126 See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 437 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 127 Id. at 440–41. 
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Because he did not write separately in Ross, we cannot know whether he 
thought that Ross adopted his rule or whether, like Justices Blackmun and 
Powell, he thought that Ross eliminated the confusion in prior cases. 
 We do know, however, that less than ten years after the Court decided 
Ross, the Rehnquist Court found it necessary to return to the automobile 
exception because confusion remained.  This case was California v. 
Acevedo.128 
 In Acevedo, a federal drug enforcement agent in Hawaii telephoned a 
California police department, informing the department that a package 
containing marijuana, originally destined for California, had been seized in 
Hawaii and that the package was supposed to be delivered to a Federal 
Express office in California.129  The agent sent the package to the 
California police department, which then took it to the Federal Express 
office.130  Jamie Daza arrived at the office, picked up the package, and 
drove his car with the package to an apartment.131  Charles Acevedo arrived 
at the apartment, stayed for ten minutes, and left carrying a full paper bag 
that was about the same size as one of the original packages.132  After 
placing the bag in the trunk of his car, he started to drive away.133  He was 
immediately stopped by police, who opened the trunk and found the 
marijuana.134 
 Acevedo’s case exposed the confusion that continued to exist in lower 
courts despite Ross.  The California Court of Appeals concluded that the 
marijuana evidence should have been suppressed because, even though the 
police had probable cause to believe that the paper bag (which was not an 
automobile) had marijuana in it, they did not have probable cause to 
believe that the automobile otherwise contained marijuana.135  The court of 
appeals held that because the police only had probable cause to believe that 
the paper bag contained marijuana, they had to, yet failed to, obtain a 
search warrant before opening it.136 
 Justice Blackmun wrote for the Court as it reversed.137  The Acevedo 
Court had the opportunity to abandon its prior approach and apply a 
principled approach to searches of automobiles.  All it had to do was say 
that, absent exigent circumstances, property could be seized for a 
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temporary period upon reasonable suspicion, and for a longer period upon 
probable cause, while a warrant is sought.  Such a holding would have 
recognized that most property is mobile, can be moved by car, train, or 
plane, and regardless of whether it happens to be in a house or in a car, 
cannot be moved while a warrant is sought if the house or car is under the 
control of the police. 
 Instead, Justice Blackmun held that containers in cars can be searched 
as long as there is probable cause.138  He recognized that, despite the hope 
he expressed in Ross that it would make the rules governing automobile 
searches clearer, “[t]he line between probable cause to search a vehicle and 
probable cause to search a package in that vehicle is not always 
clear . . . .”139  He also recognized that the Court’s prior decisions created 
“separate rules that govern the two objects to be searched [that] may enable 
the police to broaden their power to make warrantless searches and disserve 
privacy interests.”140  Justice Blackmun further reasoned: 
At the moment when officers stop an automobile, it may be less 
than clear whether they suspect with a high degree of certainty 
that the vehicle contains drugs in a bag or simply contains drugs.  
If the police know that they may open a bag only if they are 
actually searching the entire car, they may search more 
extensively than they otherwise would in order to establish the 
general probable cause required by Ross.141 
 This is strange reasoning.  Police who stop a car cannot search it 
completely under any circumstances without probable cause, even under 
the Court’s prior decisions.  The question for officers is whether they have 
probable cause to believe.  They cannot choose to search a car simply 
because they would like to open packages.  Ross required that there be 
probable cause to believe that the car, as opposed to a package in the car, 
contained contraband that could be searched for.142  Ross did give police an 
incentive to gather more general, as opposed to specific, information about 
precisely what type of container drugs or evidence might be found in.  But 
Ross did not give police the power to expand a search when they lacked 
probable cause with respect to the car itself.143 
 Justice Blackmun’s reasoning cannot be confined to automobiles.  In 
 
 138 Id. at 580. 
 139 Id. at 574. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. at 574–75. 
 142 United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982). 
 143 Justice Blackmun cited United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478 (1985), as an example 
of law enforcement expanding a search.  Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 575.  But the Court held in 
Johns that agents had probable cause to search trucks and therefore could search packages 
seized from trucks.  Johns, 469 U.S. at 482.  It did not hold that agents who lacked probable 
cause as to a vehicle could search either the vehicle or packages within it. 
  
1722 The George Washington Law Review [Vol. 74:1702 
Acevedo, he cited his own earlier dissent: 
 To the extent that the Chadwick-Sanders rule protects privacy, 
its protection is minimal.  Law enforcement officers may seize a 
container and hold it until they obtain a search warrant.  “Since 
the police, by hypothesis, have probable cause to seize the 
property, we can assume that a warrant will be routinely 
forthcoming in the overwhelming majority of cases.”144 
While his assumption is fair, it applies to all property, not just automobiles.  
The Court has never cited a shred of evidence to support the notion that law 
enforcement officers make better probable cause judgments about cars or 
containers in cars than they make about other property.145 
 Justice Blackmun suggested that the Court was finally ending the 
confusion over automobile searches with its Acevedo decision: 
 Until today, this Court has drawn a curious line between the 
search of an automobile that coincidentally turns up a container 
and the search of a container that coincidentally turns up in an 
automobile.  The protections of the Fourth Amendment must not 
turn on such coincidences.  We therefore interpret Carroll as 
providing one rule to govern all automobile searches.  The police 
may search an automobile and the containers within it where they 
have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is 
contained.146 
Unfortunately, the suggestion was wrong, and confusion remains.  
Suppose, for example, police have probable cause to believe that a bag of 
marijuana is in the trunk of a car.  Can they search the entire car?  The full 
trunk?  Only the part of the trunk that contains a bag?147  It will take yet 
another Supreme Court decision to provide an answer. 
 
 144 Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 575 (citation omitted) (quoting Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 
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G. The Problem with Arbitrary Rules 
 The problem with arbitrary rules like the automobile exception to the 
warrant requirement is that because they have no principled basis, they 
provide no guidance as to how law enforcement officers should deal with a 
new set of facts. 
 For example, suppose Federal Express telephones law enforcement 
agents to report a suspicious package which is emitting an odor or leaking 
powder, suggesting it might contain drugs.  The package was just off-
loaded from a truck.  Can the package be searched without a warrant?  
After all, it is mobile, it has actually been moved, and it could be moved 
again.  Does the fact that it was recently in a vehicle bring it within the 
automobile exception?  It will take a new Supreme Court decision for 
anyone to be sure. 
 Consider another scenario, where the police have probable cause to 
believe that a bicycle might contain drugs in a saddle bag.  Is a bicycle the 
equivalent of an automobile so that it can be searched without a warrant?  
What about a tricycle?  Only the new Supreme Court can tell us. 
 What qualifies an item as a vehicle?  Is a suitcase or a shopping cart 
with wheels the equivalent of an automobile?  What about a wagon or a 
cart?  The rule favored by then–Associate Justice Rehnquist in Robbins— 
one need not demonstrate that a particular automobile was 
capable of being moved, but that automobiles as a class are 
inherently mobile, and a defendant seeking to suppress evidence 
obtained from an automobile should not be heard to say that this 
particular automobile had broken down, was in a parking lot under 
the supervision of the police, or the like148 
—suggests that a car that has no engine or an engine that does not work 
still falls within the automobile exception.  But the rule still does not 
answer the basic question: what is a car? 
 What about a delivery person on inline skates who the police believe is 
unknowingly carrying a package with drugs?  Is he or she equivalent to an 
automobile? 
 In a sensible world, one would neither ask nor answer these questions.  
Instead, one would adopt a principle that would enable future actors to 
respond logically to new circumstances.  That principle would recognize 
that automobiles and all other moveable property should be treated the 
same way.  If moveable property outside automobiles generally can be 
detained while a warrant is sought and searched only after such warrant has 
been obtained (absent exigent circumstances), the same rule should apply 
to automobiles.  If it did, we would not have to worry about the proper 
 
 148 Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 440–41 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), 
overruled by United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). 
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treatment of bicycles, tricycles, wagons, shopping carts, luggage with 
wheels, and inline skating delivery personnel. 
II. More on Automobiles: Search Incident to Arrest 
 The Supreme Court has treated automobiles with disfavor not only by 
establishing the automobile exception discussed above, but also in its 
handling of the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine.  The Court has 
abandoned a rational, principled rule governing searches incident to arrest 
in favor of an arbitrary and confusing approach. 
A. The Pendulum Swings 
 Until 1969, the Court wavered in its approach to searches incident to 
arrest.  The Carroll case, discussed above,149 offered the first dictum 
suggesting that a search incident to arrest could extend beyond the person 
arrested to the place where the person was arrested: “When a man is legally 
arrested for an offense, whatever is found upon his person or in his control 
which it is unlawful for him to have and which may be used to prove the 
offense may be seized and held as evidence in the prosecution.”150  Decided 
shortly after Carroll, Agnello v. United States151 relied in part upon Carroll 
for this dictum: 
 The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to search 
persons lawfully arrested while committing crime and to search 
the place where the arrest is made in order to find and seize things 
connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means by which it 
was committed, as well as weapons and other things to effect an 
escape from custody, is not to be doubted.152 
 As often happens, dictum leads to holding.  In Marron v. United 
States,153 agents executing a warrant to search a speakeasy for liquor and 
related items seized an incriminating ledger that was not in the warrant.154  
The Court justified the seizure by holding that because the agents had made 
an arrest on the premises, “[t]hey had a right without a warrant 
contemporaneously to search the place in order to find and seize the things 
used to carry on the criminal enterprise.”155 
 But in Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States156 and United States v. 
 
 149 See supra text accompanying notes 12–34. 
 150 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925) (emphasis added). 
 151 Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925). 
 152 Id. at 30 (citing Carroll, 267 U.S. at 158, and Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 
383, 392 (1914)).  Weeks did not actually discuss searching places incident to arrest. 
 153 Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927). 
 154 Id. at 193–94. 
 155 Id. at 199. 
 156 Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931). 
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Lefkowitz,157 the Court distinguished Marron as involving only a slight 
intrusion158 as it held two postarrest premises searches unconstitutional.  In 
Go-Bart Importing Co., the Court held that the search of an office and the 
seizure of papers from a desk, a safe, and other parts of the office were 
forbidden.159  In Lefkowitz, the Court held that the search of an office and 
seizures from a desk and cabinet in the office were not justifiable.160 
 The restrictive attitude toward searches incident to arrest was cast 
aside in Harris v. United  States,161 as the Court approved a search of a 
four-room apartment in which officers arrested Harris on the basis of his 
alleged involvement with the cashing and interstate transportation of a 
forged check.162  The officers had searched for two cancelled checks 
thought to have been used in effecting the forgery.163 
 In the Court’s own words, “[o]nly a year after Harris, however, the 
pendulum swung again.”164  The case was Trupiano v. United States.165  
Despite the fact that agents made lawful arrests of individuals running an 
illegal distillery, the Court held that a search of the premises was invalid: 
 A search or seizure without a warrant as an incident to a lawful 
arrest has always been considered to be a strictly limited right.  It 
grows out of the inherent necessities of the situation at the time of 
the arrest.  But there must be something more in the way of 
necessity than merely a lawful arrest.166 
 The pendulum would swing again just two years later in United States 
v. Rabinowitz.167  Federal authorities secured an arrest warrant for 
Rabinowitz for dealing in stamps bearing forged overprints.168  They 
arrested him at his one-room business office and searched his desk, safe, 
 
 157 United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932). 
 158 The Court reasoned that the articles seized in Marron were “visible and accessible 
and in the offender’s immediate custody.  There was no threat of force or general search or 
rummaging of the place.”  Go-Bart Importing Co., 282 U.S. at 358.  The Court here 
essentially anticipated the future “plain-view” rule.  See, e.g., Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 
128, 142 (1990) (holding that the seizure of weapons allegedly used in a robbery was 
authorized by the “plain-view” doctrine, despite the lack of specific authorization in the 
warrant to search for weapons). 
 159 Go-Bart Importing Co., 282 U.S. at 358. 
 160 Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. at 467. 
 161 Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947). 
 162 Id. at 148, 155. 
 163 Id. at 148. 
 164 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 758 (1969). 
 165 Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948), overruled in part by United States 
v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950). 
 166 Id. at 708. 
 167 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950). 
 168 Id. at 57–58. 
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and file cabinets.169  The Court, relying on Harris, upheld the search, citing 
a number of factors: 
We think the District Court’s conclusion that here the search and 
seizure were reasonable should be sustained because: (1) the 
search and seizure were incident to a valid arrest; (2) the place of 
the search was a business room to which the public, including the 
officers, was invited; (3) the room was small and under the 
immediate and complete control of respondent; (4) the search did 
not extend beyond the room used for unlawful purposes; (5) the 
possession of the forged and altered stamps was a crime, just as it 
is a crime to possess burglars’ tools, lottery tickets or counterfeit 
money.170 
 The Court rejected the notion that a warrantless search was invalid if a 
warrant could have been secured.171  It reasoned that it was well understood 
that some searches incident to arrest were reasonable without a warrant, so 
the Fourth Amendment could not be said to prohibit all such warrantless 
searches.172  But the Court confined itself to reciting the factors relied upon 
by the district court.  It failed completely to explain what rationale or 
principle distinguished unreasonable and reasonable warrantless searches 
incident to arrest. 
B. A Principled Approach 
 Finally, in Chimel v. California,173 the Court explained the 
justifications for the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine.  In so doing, it 
stated a clear and logical principle that guided arresting officers in 
determining the proper scope of such searches. 
 Three police officers arrived at Chimel’s home with a warrant for his 
arrest for the burglary of a coin shop.174  Chimel’s wife let the officers wait 
in the house until Chimel returned.175  When he returned, the officers 
arrested him and, over Chimel’s objection, conducted a search of the three-
bedroom house, including the attic, the garage, and a small workshop.176  
The Court held that the search violated the Fourth Amendment.177 
 Justice Stewart’s opinion for the Court explained that a search incident 
to arrest had two legitimate purposes: to protect the arresting officer and to 
 
 169 Id. at 58–59. 
 170 Id. at 63–64 (footnote omitted). 
 171 Id. at 65. 
 172 Id. at 65–66. 
 173 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
 174 Id. at 753. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. at 753–54. 
 177 Id. at 768. 
  
2006] The Fourth Amendment: Code or Body of Principles? 1727 
protect against destruction or loss of evidence.178  The purpose of the 
search therefore dictated its permitted scope: 
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to 
search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the 
latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape.  
Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be endangered, and the 
arrest itself frustrated.  In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the 
arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the 
arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or 
destruction.  And the area into which an arrestee might reach in 
order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be 
governed by a like rule.179 
 Chimel demonstrates two realities about principled rules.  First, if the 
principle is clear, application by ordinary people should be relatively easy 
in most cases.  Second, no matter how clear the principle, at the outer 
margins of any rule, judgment will be required. 
 After Chimel, any reasonable officer who made a custodial arrest knew 
that he or she may search the physical person of a suspect for weapons and 
for evidence that might be destroyed.  Any reasonable officer also knew 
that he or she may also search the area in which a suspect might grab a 
weapon or evidence. 
C. The Principle Eroded 
 Judgment is required, however, if the principle is to be meaningful.  
Just four years after deciding Chimel, the Court per Justice Rehnquist 
decided United States v. Robinson.180  A District of Columbia police 
officer, who had checked the status of Robinson’s license a few days 
earlier, stopped Robinson’s car and arrested him for driving after his 
license was revoked and for obtaining a license by misrepresentation.181  
The officer conducted a search incident to arrest in which he found a 
crumpled up cigarette package in Robinson’s breast pocket, which the 
officer removed and opened.  He found fourteen gelatin capsules which 
turned out to contain heroin.182  The issue was whether opening the 
package was legitimate.  The Court said it was, announcing another bright 
line rule that “a full search of the person” is always reasonable when 
incident to a custodial arrest.183 
 
 178 Id. at 762–63. 
 179 Id. 
 180 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
 181 Id. at 220. 
 182 Id. at 221–23. 
 183 Id. at 235.  The Court stated, 
It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search, and we 
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 But Robinson was not about the full search of a person; it was about 
the search of a container found on a person.  If an officer could not 
reasonably believe that a container could contain a weapon or evidence, 
why should the officer be permitted to search it?  The Court’s answer 
seemed to be that, without a per se rule, courts would have to litigate the 
reasonableness of the officer’s judgment in every case.184 
 This is not necessarily true.  Because a custodial arrest is always an 
unwelcome experience for the arrestee, and could therefore spark a violent 
reaction against the arresting officer, there is a principled basis for the 
Court’s holding that a search for weapons is always permissible—i.e., the 
protection of the officer.  There is no such principled basis for saying that it 
is always reasonable to search for evidence that might be destroyed.  When 
an officer arrests a person for a crime and there is no possibility of finding 
evidence in any container possessed by the arrestee that could be destroyed 
by the arrestee, Chimel suggests that there is no reason to permit a search 
for evidence. 
 The Robinson Court never considered an approach that would have 
been more consistent with Chimel: i.e., (1) an officer always may search 
the arrested person for weapons and search any container from which the 
suspect could get a weapon; (2) once an officer has determined that a 
suspect has no weapon or has disarmed the suspect, the officer may only 
continue to search a container for evidence as long as there is some 
possibility that it contains evidence and the suspect remains capable of 
opening the container and destroying the contents; and (3) thereafter, the 
officer may only seize a container to bring before a magistrate in order to 
seek a warrant to search it further. 
 Would this be too complicated?  Absolutely not.  Under this 
alternative, officers would know that they can always conduct a search for 
weapons incident to arrest to protect their safety, and furthermore they 
would know that they can search for evidence as long as it is in danger of 
being destroyed.  When the dangers of physical harm or destruction of 
evidence disappear, the reason for a warrantless search also disappears.  
This is hardly rocket science, because it is a staple of Fourth Amendment 
law in other contexts.185 
 
hold that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not 
only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also 
a ‘reasonable’ search under that Amendment. 
Id. 
 184 See id. 
 185 See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393–95 (1978) (rejecting a “murder 
scene exception” to the warrant requirement and holding that when exigency disappears, a 
warrant is required). 
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D. The Automobile and Search Incident to Arrest 
 While Robinson eroded to some extent the principle established in 
Chimel, New York v. Belton186 essentially ignored the Chimel principle.  
This was somewhat surprising because Justice Stewart, the author of 
Chimel, wrote for the Court in Belton. 
 In Belton, a New York state trooper driving an unmarked car saw 
another car speeding on the New York Thruway, chased the car, pulled it 
over, and asked to see the driver’s license and registration.187  He 
discovered that none of the men in the car owned it or were related to its 
owner, smelled burnt marijuana in the car, and saw an envelope marked 
“Supergold” on the floor of the car, which he associated with marijuana.188  
The trooper ordered the four male occupants out of the car, placed them all 
under arrest, patted them down, placed them in four different areas outside 
the car, picked up the envelope, found that it contained marijuana, gave the 
men Miranda warnings,189 and searched them all incident to arrest.190  The 
officer also searched the passenger compartment of the car, found a black 
jacket belonging to Belton, searched it, and found cocaine.191  The officer 
put the jacket and the men in his car and drove them to the police station.192 
 There is little doubt that the officer acted properly in all respects.  He 
properly stopped the vehicle for speeding and requested to see the driver’s 
license and registration.  After he smelled burnt marijuana and saw the 
envelope, he had probable cause to believe that the men were sharing 
marijuana and appropriately arrested them.  The search of their persons 
incident to arrest was clearly valid. 
 The officer also had probable cause to believe that there was marijuana 
in the car.  Because the officer was determined to take the men into 
custody, it was reasonable for him to search the interior of the car for the 
marijuana rather than leave it for whoever might come along while the car 
sat unprotected on the Thruway.  The search of the car was an exigent-
circumstance search—the officer obviously could not remove the men and 
protect the car at the same time.  Of course, an officer can always call for 
backup, but there is no constitutional requirement that an officer always do 
so, and there is no unlimited supply of backup for every stop and arrest an 
officer might make. 
 Rather than treat the case as a classic example of exigent 
circumstances, Justice Stewart’s opinion for the Court recognized that 
 
 186 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). 
 187 Id. at 455. 
 188 Id. at 455–56. 
 189 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467–73 (1966). 
 190 Belton, 453 U.S. at 456. 
 191 Id. 
 192 Id. 
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Chimel set forth a principled rule, suggested that the rule was confusing 
and that a clearer rule for cars was needed,193 and adopted a per se rule for 
 
 193 Justice Stewart noted,  
  Although the principle that limits a search incident to a lawful custodial arrest 
may be stated clearly enough, courts have discovered the principle difficult to 
apply in specific cases.  Yet, as one commentator has pointed out, the protection of 
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments “can only be realized if the police are 
acting under a set of rules which, in most instances, makes it possible to reach a 
correct determination beforehand as to whether an invasion of privacy is justified in 
the interest of law enforcement.” 
Id. at 458 (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, “Case-by-Case Adjudication” Versus “Standardized 
Procedures”: The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 127, 142).  Although Justice 
Stewart made the assertion about the difficulty lower courts were having, he cited no cases 
to illustrate the point.  It is difficult to see why lower courts would have found Chimel 
difficult to apply.  Its principle is easy to state, and it requires only a limited amount of 
judgment. 
  Elsewhere in the opinion, however, Justice Stewart purported to identify examples 
of confusion in the lower courts.  See id. at 459 & n.1.  After evaluating these cases 
mentioned by Justice Stewart, Professor David S. Rudstein concluded that “some of the 
cases cited by the Court in Belton as examples of cases reaching inconsistent results may not 
have done so.”  David S. Rudstein, Belton Redux: Reevaluating Belton’s Per Se Rule 
Governing the Search of an Automobile Incident to an Arrest, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
1287, 1324–27, 1324 n.191 (2005).  Professor Rudstein’s description of the cases and the 
issues they address is insightful and demonstrates the kind of questions that can arise when 
officers arrest individuals in cars.  I agree with his conclusion that the Court failed to justify 
the per se rule in Belton.  Id. at 1287–88.  Although it is true that the cited cases involved 
cars in one way or another, it would be wrong to assume that any confusion in the lower 
courts actually arose because of the presence of a car in the cases.  The same issues 
involving cars arose in other contexts in which people were arrested.  The confusion 
occurred because police naturally want to take full advantage of the permissible “free 
search” (i.e., the automatic search) following an arrest.  To take full advantage, they may 
seek to expand the scope of the search as much as possible. 
  For example, an officer might arrest someone in her home while she is sitting next 
to a locked suitcase or chest, handcuff her and remove the suitcase from her reach.  The 
officer may want to search the suitcase.  Once the suitcase is out of reach of the arrestee, 
however, there is no greater reason to permit a warrantless search than if the suitcase were 
in the next room when the arrest occurred.  If the Court were to say that when the exigency 
ended (i.e., when the reasonable possibility that a suspect could reach into a place for a 
weapon or evidence dissipated), the search-incident-to-arrest exception becomes 
inapplicable, the Court would be true to the principles set forth in Chimel and to its 
emphasis on the Warrant Clause and judicial supervision over searches absent true exigent 
circumstances.  Moreover, a focus on whether an actual exigency exits would make clear to 
law enforcement officers that exigent circumstances permit immediate reactions without the 
necessity of relying on arbitrary doctrines similar to that laid down in Belton. 
  One gets a feeling from the lower court cases that judges feel that the police are 
somehow “cheated” if they remove the exigency before they have conducted a search.  One 
example of this is found in United States v. Frick, 490 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1973).  The court 
held that a search incident to arrest was valid where the defendant was arrested before he 
entered his car (thus making it not a true Belton situation) and his attaché case, which was in 
the back seat of his car, was searched.  Id. at 669–70.  Under these circumstances, it is 
difficult to see why an automatic search of the case was more justifiable than it would have 
been if the defendant were arrested on the front porch of his house, and the case was inside 
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cars with two major parts: (1) “when a policeman has made a lawful 
custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a 
contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment 
of that automobile” and (2) “the police may also examine the contents of 
any containers found within the passenger compartment . . . whether it is 
open or closed.”194 
 There was no convincing reason for Belton to abandon Chimel’s 
clearly stated principle.  The apparent reason for the change was that the 
Court realized that in the factual scenario presented in Belton, as well as in 
many similar cases, the police would not be able to search a car incident to 
arrest under the Chimel rule and did not want to deprive the police of the 
opportunity to do so. 
 When police officers stop cars, they often order the driver and all 
passengers out of the car, a practice the Supreme Court has upheld.195  If 
the officer makes an arrest and handcuffs a suspect outside the car, often 
there is no reasonable possibility that the suspect could seize a weapon or 
evidence in the car, especially if the car doors are closed.  This means that 
had the arrest been made while the suspect was in the car, an officer could 
have searched wherever in the car the suspect could have reached, but 
when the arrest is made outside the car and there are no exigent 
circumstances, the officer loses the right to search the interior of the car. 
 This is an accurate description of what would happen if Chimel were 
applied to the facts of Belton.  Why is this a problem?  This result is 
precisely what Chimel’s principle dictates.  A search incident to arrest is 
not some right given to officers because the Court thinks officers should 
have an entitlement to a “free search”—without probable cause or a 
warrant.  When the reasons for a warrantless search disappear, such a 
search should not be permitted. 
 The Court in Belton did not say that the decision was intended to give 
the police a free search, although that is the end result of the decision.  
Instead, Justice Stewart argued that his own opinion in Chimel was 
confusing as applied to cars and that there was a need for a clear rule.196  
He did not explain, however, why Chimel was more confusing with respect 
to cars than any other place where an arrest occurs. 
 Justice Stewart also failed to recognize that a principled rule always 
provides more guidance than an arbitrary one.  Fair application of Chimel 
would have resulted in a holding in Belton that a search of the car incident 
to arrest was not permissible, but would in no way have inhibited the Court 
 
his house not far from the front door. 
 194 Belton, 453 U.S. at 459–61 (footnotes omitted). 
 195 See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977) (driver); Maryland v. 
Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 410 (1997) (passengers). 
 196 Belton, 453 U.S. at 460. 
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from recognizing that the search of the individuals was nonetheless 
permissible, and that the search of the car also was permissible because of 
exigent circumstances.  A fair application of Chimel would have bolstered 
the principle laid down in that case and thereby provided more guidance 
than Belton could possibly provide.  Belton, as it turned out, was not a clear 
rule. 
E. The Confusion of Belton 
 What is the passenger compartment of a car?  Consider the vast range 
of options.  Are vans and minivans to be treated as though their interiors 
are nothing but passenger compartments?  Are the storage areas of 
hatchbacks part of the passenger compartment if the cover is up, but part of 
a trunk if the cover is down?197  How are station wagons to be treated?  Is 
there a passenger “compartment” of a motorcycle?  Justice Brennan asked 
some of these questions in his dissenting opinion in Belton.198 
 There are no easy answers to these questions.  There never are when 
arbitrary rules are adopted because there is no way to reason from one 
arbitrary conclusion to another. 
 Justice Brennan’s dissent recognized that the situation involving an 
arrest of someone who has been in a car is not so different from an arrest of 
someone at home.199  A slightly different scenario from the one raised by 
the dissent illustrates how the two arrest scenarios could be similar.  
Suppose that police officers arrest a person at her home, handcuff her, and 
bring her outside.  Can they go back and search the part of home they 
would have been able to search if the suspect were still inside, i.e., the part 
of the home where the suspect could have accessed a weapon or evidence?  
Lower courts have disagreed, but there seems to be something of a trend to 
saying yes.  If it is right to make a search in Belton after it is clear that 
danger to officers and destruction of evidence are no longer concerns, why 
is it less right to make the same search when a home is involved?  The 
 
 197 See, e.g., United States v. Doward, 41 F.3d 789, 794 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that 
the hatch area of a two-door Ford Mustang generally is within the passenger compartment). 
 198 Specifically, Justice Brennan asked: 
Does [the passenger compartment] include locked glove compartments, the interior 
of door panels, or the area under the floorboards?  Are special rules necessary for 
station wagons and hatchbacks, where the luggage compartment may be reached 
through the interior, or taxicabs, where a glass panel might separate the driver’s 
compartment from the rest of the car?  Are the only containers that may be 
searched those that are large enough to be “capable of holding another object”?  Or 
does the new rule apply to any container, even if it “could hold neither a weapon 
nor evidence of the criminal conduct for which the suspect was arrested”? 
Belton, 453 U.S. at 470 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 199 Id.  Justice Brennan posited, “What if a suspect is seen walking out of a house 
where the police, peering in from outside, had formed probable cause to believe a crime was 
being committed?  Could the police then arrest that suspect and enter the house to conduct a 
search incident to arrest?”  Id. 
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Belton majority provided no answer. 
 There are at least two other major problems with Belton that can arise 
at any place an arrest occurs.  First, suppose an arrestee has a locked 
suitcase or briefcase that cannot easily be opened, and the arrestee is 
subdued and handcuffed.  Should the police be permitted to break open the 
suitcase or briefcase when there is no possibility that its contents could be 
harmful to them or be destroyed?  Belton says they can, and it says so in 
part because once Robinson eroded the Chimel principle while purporting 
to deal only with searches of the person, it was very easy to conclude that 
the same principle should apply to containers near the person.200 
 Second, there is the related question of how long a search incident to 
arrest should take.  What if it takes bolt cutters to open a container?  Can 
the police take a half hour at the scene of an arrest to force open a container 
they have total control of?  If not, for how long can they try to break it 
open?  Chimel appeared to assume that a search incident would be a quick 
search to protect officers and evidence.  Belton’s statement that any 
container may be searched—open or closed, locked or unlocked—raises 
questions of how long as well as why.201 
F. Confusion Reduced or Exacerbated? 
 As was true of the automobile exception, the Rehnquist Court was not 
responsible for Chimel, Robinson, or Belton (although Justice Rehnquist 
authored Robinson).  The Rehnquist Court did have an opportunity, 
however, to reconsider or limit Belton and return to principled 
jurisprudence in Thornton v. United States.202 
 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court as it held that Belton, not 
Chimel, applied when police officers arrest a suspect after he or she gets 
out of a car.203  The case arose when a Norfolk police officer thought a car 
was driving suspiciously.204  The officer checked the license plates and 
discovered that they were issued to a different car from the one he saw.205  
Meanwhile, Thornton, the driver of the car, drove into a parking lot, parked 
 
 200 Not surprisingly, lower courts have read Belton as eliminating any distinction 
between searches of persons and searches of objects within an arrestee’s control.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Johnson, 846 F.2d 279, 282 (5th Cir. 1988) (“We conclude that Belton 
eradicates any differences between searches of the person and searches within the arrestee’s 
immediate control.”).  A concurring judge wrote that “Belton constituted a virtual overruling 
of the rationale of Chimel.”  Id. at 284 (Williams, C.J., concurring). 
 201 A third problem might arise if there is a dispute as to what constitutes a container in 
an automobile.  See, e.g., United States v. Diaz-Lizaraza, 981 F.2d 1216, 1222 (11th Cir. 
1993) (noting that the search of an automobile incident to arrest may not include damaging 
the vehicle in any way, including the ripping of upholstery). 
 202 Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004). 
 203 Id. at 620. 
 204 Id. at 617. 
 205 Id. at 618. 
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his car, and got out of the car.206  After Thornton was out of the car, the 
officer approached him and asked for his driver’s license.207  During the 
ensuing conversation, Thornton admitted, in response to questions from the 
officer, that he had drugs on his person, and produced them for the 
officer.208  The officer arrested Thornton, handcuffed him, and put him in 
the back seat of his patrol car before searching Thornton’s car and finding a 
handgun under the driver’s seat.209 
 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion concluded that Belton did not turn 
on whether the arrest was made in the vehicle, and reasoned,  
 In all relevant aspects, the arrest of a suspect who is next to a 
vehicle presents identical concerns regarding officer safety and the 
destruction of evidence as the arrest of one who is inside the 
vehicle.  An officer may search a suspect’s vehicle under Belton 
only if the suspect is arrested.210 
This language is incredibly broad, suggesting that any time anyone is 
arrested next to a vehicle, that vehicle may be searched incident to arrest.  
The opinion also reasoned, “[N]or is an arrestee less likely to attempt to 
lunge for a weapon or to destroy evidence if he is outside of, but still in 
control of, the vehicle,”211 which suggests that the decision might be 
confined to an arrestee’s own vehicle.  This, however, is not totally clear. 
 Even less clear is whether there was any danger of Thornton lunging 
into the car after he was arrested.  If not, then there was nothing to support 
the search as incident to arrest.  Chief Justice Rehnquist conceded that there 
might have been little or no danger: 
It is unlikely in this case that petitioner could have reached under 
the driver’s seat for his gun once he was outside of his 
automobile.  But the firearm and the passenger compartment in 
general were no more inaccessible than were the contraband and 
the passenger compartment in Belton.  The need for a clear rule, 
readily understood by police officers and not depending on 
differing estimates of what items were or were not within reach of 
an arrestee at any particular moment, justifies the sort of 
generalization which Belton enunciated.212 
 
 206 Id. 
 207 Id. 
 208 Id. 
 209 Id.  Whether the search would qualify as a justified probable-cause, exigent-
circumstance search would turn on whether the officer had probable cause to believe that 
additional drugs were in the car.  If so, given that the car was in a public parking lot, the 
officer might well have been warranted in searching it before removing Thornton to the 
station house. 
 210 Id. at 620–21. 
 211 Id. at 621. 
 212 Id. at 622–23 (footnote omitted).  Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment, wrote 
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 This would be remarkable if it were not so typical of Fourth 
Amendment Supreme Court cases.  Belton approved of a search incident to 
arrest in which neither the officer nor evidence were endangered by 
arrestees.213  Thornton extends the Belton rule by analogy: the danger in 
Thornton was no less than the danger in Belton because there was no real 
danger in either case.214  The original and extended rules are needed, 
according to the Court, to provide clarity.215  But there is no more clarity 
after Thornton than before.  Must a suspect have recently been in a car to 
justify a search incident when an arrest is outside the car?  If so, how 
recently?  As Chief Justice Rehnquist put it, “So long as an arrestee is the 
sort of ‘recent occupant’ of a vehicle such as petitioner was here, officers 
may search that vehicle incident to the arrest.”216  This is not clear guidance 
to police officers. 
 What if a suspect steps out of his home, opens his trunk, removes a 
bag, and closes the trunk?  Is he the sort of “recent occupant” the Chief 
Justice described?  Who knows? 
 Moreover, Thornton provides no guidance as to a suspect who 
approaches a car.  Does the Belton rule apply to future occupants of 
vehicles?  If so, must the officer know whose car the suspect is 
approaching?  Some day, the Supreme Court may answer these questions. 
 It should be obvious that such bright line rules are not so bright and are 
hardly understandable as rules.  Even Justices who supported Belton had 
second thoughts in Thornton.  Justice O’Connor, for example, in her one-
paragraph partial concurrence wrote, “[L]ower court decisions seem now to 
treat the ability to search a vehicle incident to the arrest of a recent 
occupant as a police entitlement rather than as an exception justified by the 
twin rationales of Chimel v. California.  That erosion is a direct 
consequence of Belton’s shaky foundation.”217 
 Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Ginsburg, concurred only in the 
judgment.218  He concluded that Belton could not be squared with 
Chimel.219  The Belton rule could only be retained, he argued, by adopting 
 
as follows: 
  When petitioner’s car was searched in this case, he was neither in, nor 
anywhere near, the passenger compartment of his vehicle.  Rather, he was 
handcuffed and secured in the back of the officer’s squad car.  The risk that he 
would nevertheless “grab a weapon or evidentiary ite[m]” from his car was remote 
in the extreme. 
Id. at 625 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (alteration in original). 
 213 See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981). 
 214 See Thornton, 541 U.S. at 622. 
 215 Id. at 622–23. 
 216 Id. at 623–24 (footnote omitted). 
 217 Id. at 624 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part) (citation omitted). 
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the broader Rabinowitz approach to searches incident to arrest and limiting 
its application to cars (which have a lesser expectation of privacy).220  
Justice Scalia also suggested that Robinson—under which any arrest 
justifies a search—was wrongly decided.221 
 The end result is that the Court has created a rule for searches incident 
to arrests made near cars that is as arbitrary and confusing as the 
automobile exception.  Confusion abounds when rules are established 
without foundations. 
III. Some Basic Principles 
 This article is not just about cars.  Its goal is to demonstrate how 
principled decision making can simultaneously enhance Fourth 
Amendment protections and provide guidance to law enforcement officials 
without making the Fourth Amendment the Internal Revenue Code of 
criminal procedure.  Because the Amendment controls two types of 
government intrusions upon individuals—seizures and searches—it may be 
useful to consider what basic principles the Court ought to establish clearly 
as to each.  Before examining these principles, there is a preliminary point 
to be made. 
A. Consensual Versus Nonconsensual Activity 
 The preliminary point is that law enforcement officers and other 
government agents are as entitled to ask an individual to consent to, permit, 
or engage in a particular activity as any nongovernmental person.  Because 
anyone can walk up to another person and ask, “May I talk to you?” law 
enforcement officers may do the same.  Although it is unusual, anyone can 
contact another person and ask for a tour of the other person’s house.  Law 
enforcement officials may do the same.  In theory, one person may ask 
another for permission to search the other’s person or things, and law 
enforcement officers may do the same.  Consensual activity is generally 
reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes.222  Reasonable suspicion and 
 
 220 Id. 
 221 Id. at 631–32. 
 222 See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 200–01 (2002) (“Even when law 
enforcement officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may pose 
questions, ask for identification, and request consent to search luggage—provided they do 
not induce cooperation by coercive means.  If a reasonable person would feel free to 
terminate the encounter, then he or she has not been seized.”); Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 
U.S. 1, 5–6 (1984) (per curiam) (explaining that asking a suspect to talk in an airport is “the 
sort of consensual encounter that implicates no Fourth Amendment interest”); Florida v. 
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983) (plurality opinion) (“[L]aw enforcement officers do not 
violate the Fourth Amendment[’s prohibition of unreasonable seizures] by merely 
approaching an individual on the street or in another public place, by asking him if he is 
willing to answer some questions, [or] by putting questions to him if the person is willing to 
listen . . . .”); id. at 523 n.3 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (agreeing with plurality that no 
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probable cause are not required, nor are warrants. 
 Because law enforcement officers have authority to engage in conduct 
that is not authorized for all people, questions may arise as to whether an 
individual has consented or has merely submitted to authority.  Only the 
latter is governed by the Fourth Amendment. 
 A far better approach would be for the Court to draw lines that focus 
on the actions of law enforcement officers rather than on the beliefs of the 
individuals with whom they come in contact.  These lines are consistent 
with some Supreme Court cases and inconsistent with others, as will 
become apparent in the discussion below. 
B. Seizures and Terry Stops 
 Almost all seizures of persons or property can be broken down into 
two categories: seizures pursuant to reasonable suspicion and seizures 
pursuant to probable cause.  In the case of individuals, these are Terry stops 
and arrests.223  In the case of property, all seizures look similar: some are 
preliminary to seeking warrants, while others are preliminary to warrantless 
searches. 
1. When Does a Stop Occur? 
 The Court’s approach to seizures originated with Justice Stewart’s 
plurality opinion in United States v. Mendenhall,224 and in Justice White’s 
plurality opinion in Florida v. Royer.225  A seizure of an individual occurs, 
according to the plurality in Mendenhall, when a reasonable person would 
not feel free to terminate an encounter.226  Justice Kennedy’s opinion for 
the Court in United States v. Drayton227 stated the same rule in converse 
form: “If a reasonable person would feel free to terminate the encounter, 
then he or she has not been seized.”228  Stated either way, the test focuses 
on reasonable people and their feelings. 
 The Court focused on what a reasonable person would feel under the 
circumstances.  The problem with such a focus is that reasonable people 
may not feel free to terminate any encounter with the police because they 
may not know and are not told that they have a right to terminate an 
encounter.229  Thus, what an officer might regard as a request for 
 
seizure occurred when the detectives first approached and questioned the suspect). 
 223 See supra Part I.B. 
 224 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980). 
 225 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983). 
 226 Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 (plurality opinion). 
 227 United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002). 
 228 Id. at 201. 
 229 Then–Associate Justice Rehnquist recognized this for the Court in INS v. Delgado, 
466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984) (“While most citizens will respond to a police request, the fact 
that people do so, and do so without being told they are free not to respond, hardly 
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permission may be heard as a command by many individuals.230  Although 
an argument could be made that a seizure occurs any time an officer 
approaches an individual and does not affirmatively state that the 
individual is free at any time to terminate the encounter, the Supreme Court 
has rejected this argument in the context of consent searches.231  And there 
are good reasons why law enforcement officers should not be required to 
discourage individuals from cooperating with them.232 
 The Court erred by focusing on the hypothetical feelings of a 
“reasonable person.”  If reasonable people generally do not feel free to 
terminate any encounter with officers, they feel “seized” to some extent 
from the outset of any encounter.  Yet the Court was not prepared to call all 
encounters seizures or to require warnings in all encounters.  Although the 
Court’s holdings suggest that reasonable people feel free to terminate 
encounters, surveys among groups of students and judges show 
disagreement with the Court’s assessment of reasonable people.233  
Furthermore, the holdings are not particularly useful in the long run to law 
enforcement officers because they tend to be fact-specific.  Giving only 
fact-specific guidance, the Court then requires police officers to foresee 
accurately how a reasonable person would react and what he or she would 
believe, a task which they have no particular ability, education, or training 
to accomplish. 
2. A Better Approach 
 A better approach is to focus on the conduct of law enforcement 
officers rather than on the reactions of individuals to law enforcement 
officers.  This approach asks law enforcement officers to pay attention to 
their own actions, not to predict how reasonable civilians would respond to 
those actions. 
 Any time that a law enforcement officer uses physical force, threats of 
any kind, or physically makes it appear difficult for a person to terminate 
 
eliminates the consensual nature of the response.”). 
 230 See Daniel J. Steinbock, The Wrong Line Between Freedom and Restraint: The 
Unreality, Obscurity, and Incivility of the Fourth Amendment Consensual Encounter 
Doctrine, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 507, 535 (2001) (“Far from feeling free to terminate an 
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 231 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 231–32 (1973). 
 232 See id. (noting that consent searches are standard in police investigatory work and 
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an encounter, courts should say that there has been a seizure.234  If the 
Court had followed this approach, it would have decided a number of cases 
differently, and it would have enabled law enforcement officers to know 
what they cannot do without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. 
 Drayton is a good example.  At a scheduled stop for a Greyhound bus, 
the driver permitted three police officers to board the bus as part of a 
routine drug and weapons enforcement effort.235  The officers, dressed in 
plain clothes, had visible badges and carried concealed weapons.236  Two 
officers went to the rear of the bus, while the third officer stayed up front, 
kneeling down on the driver’s seat and looking towards the rear.237  One of 
the two officers who had gone to the back of the bus walked forward, 
asking questions of passengers and seeking to match passengers with their 
bags in the overhead racks.238  This officer approached two men, Drayton 
and Brown, stuck his face twelve to eighteen inches from Drayton’s face as 
he leaned over Drayton’s shoulders, and identified himself as a police 
officer doing a drug investigation in a voice both men could hear.239  The 
officer asked about Drayton’s luggage, obtained permission to search it, but 
found no contraband.240  The officer then asked Brown whether he had any 
weapons or drugs and whether he could check Brown’s “person.”241  
Brown consented, and during the ensuing pat down, the officer found 
drugs.242  Similarly, after obtaining consent from Drayton to search his 
person, the officer patted him down and found more drugs.243 
 The issue before the Court was “‘whether a reasonable person would 
feel free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the 
encounter.’”244  Justice Kennedy explained that in Florida v. Bostick,245 the 
Court adopted this test as more appropriate than the one stated by the 
Mendenhall and Royer pluralities for the context of searches on buses: 
Bostick first made it clear that for the most part per se rules are 
inappropriate in the Fourth Amendment context.  The proper 
 
 234 The Supreme Court almost said as much in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968): 
“Obviously, not all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves ‘seizures’ 
of persons.  Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in 
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inquiry necessitates a consideration of “all the circumstances 
surrounding the encounter.”  The Court noted next that the 
traditional rule, which states that a seizure does not occur so long 
as a reasonable person would feel free “to disregard the police and 
go about his business,” is not an accurate measure of the coercive 
effect of a bus encounter.  A passenger may not want to get off a 
bus if there is a risk it will depart before the opportunity to 
reboard.  A bus rider’s movements are confined in this sense, but 
this is the natural result of choosing to take the bus; it says nothing 
about whether the police conduct is coercive.246 
 In sum, Bostick attempted to frame the question of whether “a 
reasonable person would feel free to disregard the police and go about his 
business” when an encounter occurs on a bus, while Drayton sought to 
answer the question on the facts presented.247 
 It is certainly arguable that when reasonable people are confronted by 
multiple police officers on a bus, some of whom are standing at the front 
and rear of the bus while another roams the aisle asking questions of 
passengers, many people would not feel free to disregard the officers and 
go about their business.  Presumably, the officers decided to enter the bus 
and take up the positions they did to send a message to the passengers—
i.e., that they were not free to leave.  Although the officers stated in court 
that they would have let a passenger step off the bus without restriction,248 
the message they actually communicated to the passengers was far 
different. 
 When the officers manned the exits, they physically made it appear 
difficult for anyone on the bus to terminate the encounter.  This should 
have been sufficient to make it a seizure.  The same result should prevail in 
a situation in which an officer closes a door to a room, stands in front of the 
door, and then requests a conversation.  Making it appear difficult to leave 
should be sufficient to constitute a seizure. 
 This standard for a seizure would have required a different result in 
INS v. Delgado.249  In that case, Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(“INS”) agents conducted “factory surveys” by entering factories or plants 
to look for illegal aliens, with the permission of the factory owners.250  
Some agents stationed themselves near the buildings’ exits while others 
moved around the factory to question workers.251  The agents had visible 
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weapons, badges, and walkie-talkies.252  Four employees questioned in one 
of the surveys filed suit, claiming that they were seized in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.253  Incredibly, the Court concluded that because the 
employees were working inside the factory and only faced the possibility of 
questioning if they tried to leave, the placement of armed guards at the 
doors had no coercive effect.254  This is a strange view of how reasonable 
people might react if the exit doors at their workplace were blocked by 
armed individuals.  Presumably, the doors were manned because the INS 
agents thought people might otherwise leave.  Law enforcement officers 
certainly understand that when they use force, threats, or block normal 
means of ingress or egress, they are conducting a seizure.  Officers need 
not and should not be required to double as psychoanalysts simply to 
determine whether their actions constitute a seizure.  Yet the Court’s 
reasoning in Delgado seems to require this very thing.  Officers would have 
a much easier time focusing on their own actions. 
3. Unsuccessful Attempts 
 Focusing on the actions of the police rather than on the reactions of 
individuals to the police would reinforce the constitutional mandate that 
police can never use force or threats in dealing with individuals unless they 
satisfy the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.  Such a focus would 
have led to a very different result in a case like California v. Hodari D.255 
 Hodari D. arose when police officers encountered a group of youths 
huddled around a car who fled when they saw the officers.256  Hodari, one 
of the fleeing youths, threw away a small rock as a pursuing officer was 
about to catch him.257  The officer tackled Hodari, handcuffed him, and 
discovered that the discarded rock was crack cocaine.258  The only issue 
before the Court was whether Hodari had been seized when he saw the 
officer running towards him and subsequently dropped the cocaine.259 
 Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court distinguished between two types 
of seizures: those in which the officer has physically touched a person in an 
effort to restrain the person, and those in which the arrestee has submitted 
to an officer’s nonphysical show of authority.260  With respect to physical-
touching seizures, Justice Scalia wrote, “To constitute an arrest . . . —the 
quintessential ‘seizure of the person’ under our Fourth Amendment 
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jurisprudence—the mere grasping or application of physical force with 
lawful authority, whether or not it succeeded in subduing the arrestee, was 
sufficient.”261 
 Applying this test in Hodari D., Justice Scalia’s reasoning suggested 
that if the officer had touched Hodari (i.e., seized him) before Hodari threw 
the cocaine, there would have been a seizure and the evidence would have 
been suppressed.262  Justice Scalia also noted, however, that at some point 
the effects of an unsuccessful attempt to arrest dissipate: 
 To say that an arrest is effected by the slightest application of 
physical force, despite the arrestee’s escape, is not to say that for 
Fourth Amendment purposes there is a continuing arrest during 
the period of fugitivity.  If, for example, [the officer] had laid his 
hands upon Hodari to arrest him, but Hodari had broken away and 
had then cast away the cocaine, it would hardly be realistic to say 
that that disclosure had been made during the course of an 
arrest.263 
 As for nonphysical seizures, Justice Scalia reasoned that the 
Mendenhall “free to leave” test264 was a necessary, but not a dispositive, 
test for determining whether a seizure has occurred.265  He concluded that a 
person is not seized when she is not touched and does not submit to police 
action, even though reasonable persons would not feel free to resist: 
The word “seizure” readily bears the meaning of a laying on of 
hands or application of physical force to restrain movement, even 
when it is ultimately unsuccessful.  (“She seized the purse-
snatcher, but he broke out of her grasp.”)  It does not remotely 
apply, however, to the prospect of a policeman yelling “Stop, in 
the name of the law!” at a fleeing form that continues to flee.  
That is no seizure.266 
In the footnote accompanying this quote, Justice Scalia described and 
dismissed the English-common-law prohibition on unlawful attempted 
seizures: 
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 For this simple reason—which involves neither “logic-
chopping,” nor any arcane knowledge of legal history—it is 
irrelevant that English law proscribed “an unlawful attempt to take 
a presumptively innocent person into custody.”  We have 
consulted the common law to explain the meaning of seizure—
and, contrary to the dissent’s portrayal, to expand rather than 
contract that meaning (since one would not normally think that the 
mere touching of a person would suffice).  But neither usage nor 
common-law tradition makes an attempted seizure a seizure.  The 
common law may have made an attempted seizure unlawful in 
certain circumstances; but it made many things unlawful, very few 
of which were elevated to constitutional proscriptions.267 
 It seems that the English common law made perfect sense, much more 
so than Justice Scalia.  Consider again a physical touching.  If, in fact, an 
officer grabbed a person and had control of her, no one would doubt that a 
seizure occurred.  If the person broke away, reasonable people would 
conclude that an escape from a seizure had been accomplished.  Suppose, 
however, an officer sought to grab a suspect, tripped, and brushed a finger 
against the suspect as the suspect began to run.  No one would say that the 
suspect had been seized in any normal understanding of a physical seizure, 
but as the Court appropriately interprets the Fourth Amendment, such a 
slight touching would constitute a seizure.268  Why?  The answer is that no 
person should be put at risk of the use of force or threats unless 
constitutional standards are satisfied. 
 Now, say that the officer tripped before his finger touched the suspect, 
but the officer yelled, “Stop or I’ll shoot!”  After taking one step as if to 
flee, the suspect dropped dead of a heart attack.  Following his opinion in 
Hodari D., Justice Scalia would reason that no seizure had taken place, and 
thus the officer had taken no action that falls within the ambit of the Fourth 
Amendment.269  This makes no sense.  Whether or not suspects submit to 
official demands, the Fourth Amendment still controls what law 
enforcement officers may do.  Law enforcement officers who seek to put 
suspects at risk should be within the reach of the Fourth Amendment. 
 Apparently, Justice Scalia would hold that if an officer shot at a 
suspect to stop him from fleeing, but the bullet missed the suspect because 
he lunged away to avoid being shot, there would be no seizure.  There is 
little logic to the result that the touch of a finger that fails to restrain a 
suspect is a seizure, while an unsuccessful attempt to shoot a suspect is not. 
 The common-law prohibition on unlawful attempted seizures, on the 
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other hand, had the right focus.  Hodari D. adopted the common law with 
respect to physical touching seizures, i.e., the mere touching of a suspect is 
a seizure, even if wholly ineffective in controlling the suspect.270  The 
common law recognized, as a properly interpreted Fourth Amendment 
should, that police who attempt to use force or threats should be judged 
according to whether they had sufficient cause to do so, not whether they 
succeeded in actually touching or apprehending the suspect.  Whether or 
not they succeeded may determine the harm actually visited on individuals 
who are wrongly seized, but it should not affect the determination of the 
legality of the police action.271 
4. Reasonable Suspicion: A Necessary Ingredient 
 Absent the minimal showing of reasonable suspicion, no use of force 
or threats should be permitted under the Fourth Amendment.  This is the 
lesson of Terry v. Ohio and its progeny.272  No exceptions or “bright line” 
rules should be permitted to confuse this basic constitutional requirement.  
Thus, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court in Muehler v. 
Mena,273 written in his final term as Chief Justice, should not stand the test 
of time. 
 This case arose when police detained Iris Mena in handcuffs during a 
search of the premises that she and several others occupied.274  Police had 
reason to believe that a gang member, who was armed and dangerous and 
recently involved in a shooting, lived on the premises.275  A SWAT team 
was used to execute a search warrant in the early morning hours.276  Mena 
and three other handcuffed individuals were taken to a converted garage, 
where they were kept while the search was conducted.277  Mena filed a civil 
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to halt; it is an accident. 
 272 This line of cases is well summarized in Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 697–
701 (1981).  See infra text accompanying notes 284–301. 
 273 Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2005). 
 274 Id. at 95. 
 275 Id. 
 276 Id. at 96. 
 277 Id. 
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rights action against the police.278  A jury found that two officers violated 
the Fourth Amendment by using greater force than was reasonable and for 
a longer period than was reasonable, and awarded Mena $20,000 in actual 
damages and $40,000 in punitive damages.279  The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment for Mena.280  The 
court reviewed the denial of qualified immunity de novo,281 and held that 
the detention of Mena violated the Fourth Amendment because it was 
objectively unreasonable to confine her in the converted garage and to keep 
her in handcuffs during the search.282  The court further held that the 
officers should have released Mena as soon as it became clear that she 
posed no immediate threat.283 
 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion rejected the reasoning of the Ninth 
Circuit as he relied upon Michigan v. Summers284 as controlling 
authority.285  In Summers, police officers in Detroit were preparing to 
execute a search warrant at a house to look for narcotics when they 
encountered Summers coming down the front steps.286  They asked him to 
assist them in entering the house, detained him while they conducted their 
search, and arrested and searched him after they found narcotics in the 
basement and ascertained that he owned the house.287  In conducting the 
search of his person, the police also found heroin in his coat pocket.288 
 Justice Stevens’s opinion for the Court noted that the State’s argument 
that the search warrant authorized a search of individuals in the house, even 
if true, could not sustain the detention of Summers because he was not 
actually in the house when the police arrived to execute the warrant.289  
Justice Stevens then spent a good deal of effort distinguishing Summers 
from Dunaway v. New York290 and establishing that the intrusion on 
 
 278 Id. 
 279 Id. at 97. 
 280 Mena v. City of Simi Valley, 332 F.3d 1255, 1270 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated and 
remanded sub nom. Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2005). 
 281 Id. at 1261 n.2. 
 282 Id. at 1263–64. 
 283 Id. at 1263.  Other parts of the court’s opinion, which shall not be discussed here, 
include, e.g., whether the questioning of Mena about her immigration status constituted an 
independent Fourth Amendment violation.  See id. at 1264–66. 
 284 Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981). 
 285 Mena, 544 U.S. at 98 (citing Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981)). 
 286 Summers, 452 U.S. at 693. 
 287 Id.  The officers detained eight other individuals in the house, whose detentions 
were not at issue in this case.  Id. at 693 n.1. 
 288 Id. at 693. 
 289 Id. at 694. 
 290 Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979) (holding that police violated the 
Fourth Amendment when they took a murder suspect into custody without a warrant or 
probable cause and questioned him in an interrogation room at the police station). 
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Summers was not the equivalent of an arrest requiring probable cause.291  
He reasoned as follows: 
 In assessing the justification for the detention of an occupant of 
premises being searched for contraband pursuant to a valid 
warrant, both the law enforcement interest and the nature of the 
“articulable facts” supporting the detention are relevant.  Most 
obvious is the legitimate law enforcement interest in preventing 
flight in the event that incriminating evidence is found.  Less 
obvious, but sometimes of greater importance, is the interest in 
minimizing the risk of harm to the officers.  Although no special 
danger to the police is suggested by the evidence in this record, 
the execution of a warrant to search for narcotics is the kind of 
transaction that may give rise to sudden violence or frantic efforts 
to conceal or destroy evidence.  The risk of harm to both the 
police and the occupants is minimized if the officers routinely 
exercise unquestioned command of the situation.  Finally, the 
orderly completion of the search may be facilitated if the 
occupants of the premises are present.  Their self-interest may 
induce them to open locked doors or locked containers to avoid 
the use of force that is not only damaging to property but may also 
delay the completion of the task at hand.292 
The crucial language in the above quote has been emphasized.  Justice 
Stevens added another explanation: 
The existence of a search warrant . . . also provides an objective 
justification for the detention.  A judicial officer has determined 
that police have probable cause to believe that someone in the 
home is committing a crime.  Thus a neutral magistrate rather than 
an officer in the field has made the critical determination that the 
police should be given a special authorization to thrust themselves 
into the privacy of a home.  The connection of an occupant to that 
home gives the police officer an easily identifiable and certain 
basis for determining that suspicion of criminal activity justifies a 
detention of that occupant.293 
 The language quoted thus far is based on simple logic: if the police 
have probable cause to search a home for contraband, it is reasonable to 
suspect that anyone residing in the home might be subject to arrest if the 
contraband is found.  Thus, detaining those persons is reasonable under the 
Terry line of cases. 
 Unfortunately, Justice Stevens added more than was necessary to 
 
 291 Summers, 452 U.S. at 697–98, 701–02. 
 292 Id. at 702–03 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). 
 293 Id. at 703–04 (footnote omitted). 
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decide the case: 
If the evidence that a citizen’s residence is harboring contraband is 
sufficient to persuade a judicial officer that an invasion of the 
citizen’s privacy is justified, it is constitutionally reasonable to 
require that citizen to remain while officers of the law execute a 
valid warrant to search his home.  Thus, for Fourth Amendment 
purposes, we hold that a warrant to search for contraband founded 
on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to 
detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is 
conducted.294 
In two of the footnotes accompanying this text, Justice Stevens added that 
“[w]e do not decide whether the same result would be justified if the search 
warrant merely authorized a search for evidence,”295 and “[a]lthough 
special circumstances, or possibly a prolonged detention, might lead to a 
different conclusion in an unusual case, we are persuaded that this routine 
detention of residents of a house while it was being searched for 
contraband pursuant to a valid warrant is not such a case.”296 
 In Mena, the police searched for evidence of guns and gang 
membership paraphernalia associated with a particular individual.297  The 
officers executing the warrant found a .22 caliber handgun, ammunition, 
and some evidence of gang membership.298  Having found this, they did not 
arrest Mena because they never had reason to suspect her of involvement 
with the gang (the search warrant for the premises was issued based on 
reasonable suspicion of another resident of the house).299  Thus, three 
issues that were not decided in Summers were before the Court in Mena: 
(1) Where the police are looking for evidence directed at a particular 
individual, may they detain others on the premises while they execute a 
search warrant, absent any articulable facts suggesting that, if they found 
evidence, they would arrest the detained people?  (2) Does Summers apply 
to a search for evidence other than drugs or other contraband?  (3) Does 
Summers apply to a situation where a person, as to whom there is no 
reasonable suspicion, is handcuffed for more than two hours? 
 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court in Mena assumed that 
Summers had decided all of these questions and adopted a per se rule 
applicable to all searches of premises: “An officer’s authority to detain 
incident to a search is categorical; it does not depend on the ‘quantum of 
proof justifying detention or the extent of the intrusion to be imposed by 
 
 294 Id. at 704–05 (footnotes omitted). 
 295 Id. at 705 n.20. 
 296 Id. at 705 n.21. 
 297 Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 95–96 (2005). 
 298 Id. at 96. 
 299 Id. 
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the seizure.’”300  Although Rehnquist’s rule quoted language from Justice 
Stevens’s opinion in Summers, it ignored the fact that Summers involved 
contraband with which everyone on the premises could reasonably be 
suspected of involvement, did not decide whether its reasoning would 
apply to a search for noncontraband evidence, and left open the question of 
whether special circumstances such as a prolonged detention (or handcuffs 
perhaps?)301 might require a different result. 
 Perhaps the biggest step that the Court took in Mena was to substitute 
the word “occupant” for “resident” in applying the per se rule.302  The 
Chief Justice’s opinion in Mena authorizes an automatic seizure, including 
the use of reasonable force, upon anyone occupying any premises when a 
search warrant is executed upon that premises.303  There is no longer any 
recognition that different circumstances might require a different result. 
 Consider the implications.  Suppose that police officers have a search 
warrant to search a house for a gun belonging to X.  They arrive and 
discover that a Lamaze birthing class is being conducted in a den by X’s 
spouse.  According to Mena, the officers executing the warrant have a per 
se right to detain all of the pregnant mothers-to-be and their coaches while 
the warrant is executed.  This is indefensible. 
 Change the Lamaze class to a scout troop meeting.  Whether it is Boy 
Scouts, Girl Scouts, Eagle Scouts, or some combination, there is nothing 
reasonable about a per se rule that the scouts and the scout masters can be 
detained pending a search.  This is also indefensible. 
 Putting aside pregnant women, coaches, scouts, and scout masters, one 
can imagine a reading discussion group, a Bible study class, or any number 
of activities in which people occupy premises in which it is implausible to 
regard their detention during the execution of a search warrant as 
reasonable. 
 It makes more sense to instruct police that, pursuant to Terry, while 
 
 300 Id. at 98 (quoting Summers, 452 U.S. at 705 n.19). 
 301 The Chief Justice recognized that the use of the handcuffs was a greater intrusion 
than in Summers.  Id. at 99. 
 302 It is of paramount importance that in Summers, the suspect was a resident of the 
house that was the subject of the search warrant.  Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 693 
(1981).  The police knew that the suspect lived in the home prior to the search.  Id. at 695 
n.4.  Furthermore, Justice Stevens strongly and repeatedly emphasized the importance of the 
fact that the suspect lived at the premises: “If the evidence that a citizen’s residence is 
harboring contraband is sufficient to persuade a judicial officer that an invasion of the 
citizen’s privacy is justified, it is constitutionally reasonable to require that citizen to remain 
while officers of the law execute a valid warrant to search his home.”  Id. at 704–05.  Thus, 
although Justice Stevens did use the words “resident” and “occupant” interchangeably at 
times, the context of the case, plus his repeated emphasis on the importance of the suspect’s 
resident status, clearly demonstrates that the two words were intended to convey the same 
thing, i.e., that the suspect resided at the premises being searched.  This emphasis 
disappeared in Mena. 
 303 Mena, 544 U.S. at 98. 
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executing a search warrant, they may detain anyone at the premises who is 
reasonably likely to be arrested if the evidence being sought is found.  That 
is what Summers was all about.  The Court has frequently indicated that 
when drugs are found in a place that is shared by several people, all of 
them may be arrested.304  That is why the detention in Summers made 
sense.  Expanding Summers to all searches, regardless of what is sought or 
who is an occupant of the premises, is unwarranted.305 
5. Why and for How Long Stops Are Permitted 
 The power to stop an individual pursuant to Terry and other cases is 
intended to provide the police with a brief opportunity to ascertain whether 
they have probable cause to arrest or issue a citation for a crime or 
violation of the law.  The Terry doctrine recognizes that law enforcement 
officers cannot always know instantaneously whether a crime has been 
committed or is about to be committed.  The power to stop permits officers 
to “freeze the scene” in order to make the probable cause determination.  
Without such power, law enforcement officers might well have to make 
premature arrests in order to protect society or risk having criminals escape 
or commit crimes that could have been prevented. 
 The Court has made clear that stops are permissible only for limited 
periods.  It has not set a time limit, but police by now understand that they 
can freeze the scene for only a little while and must then make a decision of 
whether to arrest (or cite) a person or let the person go.  In United States v. 
 
 304 See, e.g., Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 
454, 455–56 (1981) (four individuals arrested when marijuana found in car).  Justice 
Rehnquist wrote for the Court in Pringle as it upheld the arrest of three occupants of a car in 
which cocaine and money were found.  Pringle, 540 U.S. at 369.  Two of the men were 
released after Pringle confessed, which is a reminder that probable cause to arrest is not an 
indication of sufficient evidence to convict.  Id. 
 305 In Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979), the Court refused to uphold a frisk of a 
bar patron who happened to be present when the police arrived to conduct a search of the 
bar pursuant to a valid search warrant.  Id. at 88–89, 96.  The search warrant authorized a 
search of the bar and the bartender for narcotics.  Id. at 88.  The Court held that officers 
needed to have specific facts suggesting that Ybarra was armed and dangerous in order to 
frisk him.  Id. at 93.  Justice Stewart’s opinion observed that “[a]lthough the search warrant, 
issued upon probable cause, gave the officers authority to search the premises and to search 
‘Greg [the bartender],’ it gave them no authority whatever to invade the constitutional 
protections possessed individually by the tavern’s customers.”  Id. at 92.  These 
constitutional protections included the right to be free from seizure as well as from searches 
(i.e., frisking), absent reasonable suspicion.  Id. at 91.  Then–Associate Justice Rehnquist 
joined Chief Justice Burger’s dissenting opinion.  Id. at 96 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).  
Justice Rehnquist also wrote his own dissent, in which the Chief Justice and Justice 
Blackmun joined.  Id. at 98 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  Justice Rehnquist argued for the 
same kind of per se rule that ultimately was adopted in Mena: “Because the police were 
aware that heroin was being offered for sale in the tavern, it was quite reasonable to assume 
that any one or more of the persons at the bar could have been involved in drug trafficking.”  
Id. at 106. 
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Place,306 the Court held that a ninety-minute detention of Place’s luggage, 
which also delayed Place, was unreasonable.307  Police used the time to 
bring the luggage from one metropolitan airport to another, where a drug 
sniffing dog was present.308  Justice O’Connor’s opinion reasoned that the 
officers had not diligently pursued their investigation and commented that 
“we have never approved a seizure of the person for the prolonged 
[ninety]-minute period involved here.”309 
 In United States v. Sharpe,310 the Court held that a twenty-minute 
delay between stopping a car and arresting its occupant was reasonable 
under the circumstances.311  The Court found that the suspect bore much of 
the responsibility for the delay as a result of his flight and failure to pull 
over as requested.312 
 The Court wisely emphasized that law enforcement officers utilizing 
their Terry powers must act diligently: “[W]e consider it appropriate to 
examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that 
was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time 
it was necessary to detain the defendant.”313 
 Diligent police action usually means detaining a suspect for a short 
time in order to decide whether to arrest or cite the suspect.  When police 
conduct a search for contraband, as in Summers and Mena,314 and they have 
reasonable suspicion to believe that a person on the premises would be 
subject to arrest if the contraband is found, detaining the suspect until the 
search is completed may constitute diligent police action even though the 
detention is longer than most Terry stops. 
 Terry seizures of property, approved first in Van Leeuwen,315 are 
indistinguishable from seizures of persons when the property seizure 
effectively detains the person possessing the property as in Place.316  The 
 
 306 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983). 
 307 Id. at 710. 
 308 Id. at 699. 
 309 Id. at 709–10. 
 310 United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985). 
 311 Id. at 688. 
 312 Id. at 687–88. 
 313 Id. at 686. 
 314 Summers and Mena involved searches conducted pursuant to warrants.  See 
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 693 (1981); Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 95–96 
(2005).  There is no reason to believe, however, that in exigent circumstances when police 
are permitted to search without a warrant for contraband, a different result would obtain 
with respect to persons found on the premises who are subject to arrest if the contraband is 
found. 
 315 See supra text accompanying notes 38–40. 
 316 See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 708–09 (1983) (noting that because the 
detention of a traveler’s luggage subjects the traveler to the possible disruption of his 
schedule and the inconvenience of either staying with his luggage or tracking it down, the 
same limitations that apply to Terry stops of individuals apply to investigative detentions of 
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permissible length of a detention of property in such circumstances equals 
the permissible length that a person may be detained.317 
 Where, however, property is detained without the possessor’s 
knowledge, as in Van Leeuwen, a detention may exceed the time that a 
person can be detained.  In Van Leeuwen, a unanimous Supreme Court 
approved of the detention of a mailed package for more than a day.318  
Lower courts have upheld seizures of mail that lasted for three days,319 but 
have also invalidated long seizures where the police failed to act 
diligently.320 
 The purpose of a Van Leeuwen–type detention is the same as the 
purpose of detaining a person: i.e., to permit law enforcement to decide 
whether there is probable cause for a full seizure and search.  The 
requirement in all detentions is that police act diligently.  But thus far, the 
cases suggest that detentions of people will only be tolerated for short 
periods of time, while detentions of property that do not effectively detain 
people may be for longer periods. 
 The Supreme Court has not addressed very many property detention 
cases.  In the future, it may have to decide whether the diligence 
requirement limits the amount of time that property may be detained, 
especially if law enforcement is aware that the failure of such property to 
arrive at its destination on time may result in substantial damage to the 
recipient.  The Court might also have to decide, with respect to both 
individuals and property, whether a prolonged detention might be 
reasonable if the investigation involved a major threat to public safety or 
national security, such as a possible terrorist attack.321  It would make sense 
for the Court to hold that detentions of property may become unreasonable 
if law enforcement detains them for a somewhat lengthy period, with the 
knowledge that a delay in delivery threatens to cause substantial injury to 
the recipient of the property.  Furthermore, it would make sense for the 
Court to hold that detentions of both persons and property may be extended 
when the probable cause inquiry involves a great threat to public safety or 
national security. 
 
luggage as well). 
 317 Id. 
 318 United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 253 (1970). 
 319 See, e.g., United States v. Aldaz, 921 F.2d 227, 231 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 320 See, e.g., United States v. Dass, 849 F.2d 414, 415 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that the 
detention of mail for seven to twenty-three days was unreasonable where diligent police 
action could have reduced the detention to thirty-six hours). 
 321 Cf. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 273–74 (2000) (holding that an anonymous tip 
that a person is carrying a gun is not sufficient to justify a stop and frisk, but also noting that 
“a report of a person carrying a bomb need [not] bear the indicia of reliability we demand 
for a report of a person carrying a firearm before the police can constitutionally conduct a 
frisk”). 
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C. Arrests 
1. Why Are Arrests Made? 
 The discussion of temporary seizures above reveals that they are made 
to give officers an opportunity to decide whether they have probable cause 
to arrest or cite, or to seek to obtain a search warrant.  But why are arrests 
made? 
 One answer is that the arrest is the initiation of a criminal process.  
Yet, an arrest is not required to initiate that process.  Issuance of a citation 
or summons charging an offense and requiring a person to appear before a 
magistrate is an alternative.  For example, Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 4(a) provides in relevant part: 
If the complaint or one or more affidavits filed with the complaint 
establish probable cause to believe that an offense has been 
committed and that the defendant committed it, the judge must 
issue an arrest warrant to an officer authorized to execute it.  At 
the request of an attorney for the government, the judge must issue 
a summons, instead of a warrant, to a person authorized to serve 
it.322 
In many places, law enforcement officers have the authority to issue a 
citation or summons in lieu of making an arrest.323  If the only reason for an 
arrest were to initiate the criminal process, an arrest might seem an 
unreasonable seizure given the availability of an adequate, less intrusive 
substitute. 
 An additional reason for arrest is to assure that a person is properly 
identified.  The booking process usually involves taking a photograph and 
fingerprinting a suspect.  But custodial arrests are not actually required to 
assure proper identification.  An officer issuing a summons or citation 
could take a photograph and even obtain fingerprints.324  Moreover, it is 
doubtful that most individuals with driver’s licenses and other forms of 
identification are carrying false identification, which itself may be a 
crime.325  If identification were the justification for arrest, arrest might 
again seem like an unreasonable seizure given the availability of an 
adequate, less intrusive substitute. 
 
 322 FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(a).  Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 4(b)(2) provides that 
“[a] summons must be in the same form as a warrant except that it must require the 
defendant to appear before a magistrate judge at a stated time and place.” 
 323 See, e.g., Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 263 (1973) (noting that police 
regulations did not require that a minor-traffic-law violator be taken into custody). 
 324 See Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 816 (1985) (leaving open the possibility that 
fingerprinting in the field based on reasonable suspicion might be permissible). 
 325 To the extent that police want to be sure that there are no outstanding warrants 
against people who are detained, they can run a background check before deciding to issue a 
summons or citation.  Arrests are not necessary to perform these checks. 
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 There are two other valid reasons why police officers arrest suspects.  
One is to prevent escape and thereby to assure that the suspect will appear 
for trial.  Given the enormous number of statutes that penalize conduct in 
this day and age, there is reason to question whether escape is really a 
threat when offenders are charged with traffic or other minor offenses.  If 
the penalty for failure to appear is set high enough, minor offenders have a 
great incentive to make court appearances. 
 Another valid reason for arrest is to remove dangerous individuals 
from situations in which they may threaten society and permit a magistrate 
to decide whether these individuals should be released pending trial and on 
what grounds.  The arrest of dangerous individuals not only protects the 
safety of the public, but it makes the public aware that law enforcement 
officials believe that a threat has been removed and that the public need not 
continue to fear the presence of a particular offender in the community.  
However, it seems obvious that not all individuals pose such a danger to 
society that their isolation, even for a brief period, is necessary. 
 These valid reasons for arrest apply to some suspects, but not to all.  
Many people who are arrested for minor crimes could easily be processed 
with a summons or citation.  Why, then, do we continue to arrest them?  At 
one time, a writ of attachment could even issue in a civil case for the 
seizure of the defendant unless adequate bail was posted.326  Few would 
think the arrest of a defendant in a civil case would be reasonable today. 
 There are practical reasons why law enforcement officers make arrests 
when circumstances do not require taking individuals into custody.  These 
reasons ought to be invalid under a “reasonable” interpretation of the 
Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement. 
 Before identifying these reasons, it is important to identify the ordeal 
entailed in a custodial arrest.  Typically, the suspect is handcuffed, fully 
searched incident to arrest, placed while handcuffed in the back seat of a 
patrol car, taken to a police station, booked (photographed and 
fingerprinted), placed in a holding cell, and after some time passes (which 
might be forty-eight hours if the arrest is on a weekend327) taken before a 
 
 326 See, e.g., The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U.S. 17, 37 (1903) (comparing in personam 
jurisdiction, where a warrant of arrest could be issued for the defendant, with in rem 
jurisdiction, where the defendant’s possessions could be attached); Palmer v. Allen, 11 U.S. 
(7 Cranch) 550, 551 (1813) (noting that in an action for trespass, assault and battery, and 
false imprisonment, the plaintiff attached the body of the defendant); see also Albright v. 
Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 278 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (noting that the purpose of an 
arrest at common law, both in criminal and civil cases, was to ensure the arrestee’s 
appearance in court). 
 327 The Supreme Court created a rebuttable presumption that it is reasonable for the 
police to arrest a suspect without a warrant for up to forty-eight hours before a magistrate 
makes a probable cause determination.  See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 
44, 56–57 (1991).  The holding deals only with the probable cause determination.  It says 
nothing about how long a person may be detained following an arrest for a minor offense 
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magistrate who determines whether to release the person and on what 
conditions.  While in a holding cell, the suspect may be housed with career 
criminals, sociopaths, and/or other extremely dangerous individuals.  
Assaults, physical and sexual, are a genuine danger.  Despite the realities 
associated with custodial arrests, most courts, including the Supreme Court, 
seem oblivious to exactly what occurs in an arrest scenario. 
 Law enforcement officers understand what happens to a custodial 
arrestee.  They know when they make an arrest of any offender who they 
have the power to take into custody that by making a custodial arrest, they 
are able to serve as judge, jury, and sentencer as well as officer of the law.  
They know this because whatever time an arrestee spends in a jail cell 
following a lawful arrest is deemed lawful incarceration, even if the law 
that the arrestee broke was punishable only by a fine.328 
 Put another way, in some circumstances a law enforcement officer can 
unilaterally determine to arrest rather than issue a summons or citation and 
can do so for the purpose of punishing the person arrested.  Arresting 
someone for such a purpose must be deemed improper in any system in 
which suspects are presumed innocent and punishment is a decision for 
judges or juries.  A related reason for arrest is to humiliate the arrestee by 
subjecting her to the “perp walk,” where the arrestee is deliberately 
marched before the news media so that she can be photographed and 
publicly displayed.329  If the purpose of publicity were only to assure the 
public that law enforcement officials believe that a danger to the 
community has been removed, the arrest and ensuing publicity both could 
be justified.  But to the extent that the public aspects of the arrest are meant 
to humiliate, the humiliation is a form of punishment that is as 
objectionable as the arrest itself.330 
 
before a release decision is made.  In most instances, however, the magistrate who makes 
the probable cause determination also makes a release decision.  Indeed, that is why a 
majority of the Court in McLaughlin was willing to give jurisdictions the forty-eight hour 
leeway—i.e., so that the probable cause determination could be combined with other 
proceedings.  Id. 
 328 See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354–55 (2001) (holding that 
there was no Fourth Amendment violation for the custodial arrest of a woman following a 
seat-belt violation that was punishable by a $25–$50 fine). 
 329 See, e.g., The Perp Walk, BUS. WK., Jan. 13, 2003, at 86.  The term “perp walk” has 
a dictionary definition: “The deliberate escorting of an arrested suspect by police in front of 
news media, esp. as a means of pressuring or humiliating the suspect.”  The American 
Heritage College Dictionary 1038 (4th ed. 2002). 
 330 In Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 612–13 (1999), the Court recognized that a desire 
to publicize law enforcement efforts is not sufficient to justify permitting media personnel to 
accompany police when a search warrant is executed.  The Court expressed concern about 
intruding into residential privacy.  Id.  It is ironic that, although the Court proclaimed in 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967), that “the Fourth Amendment protects 
people, not places,” the Court has failed to protect people against unnecessary arrests.  In 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), Chief Justice Warren described the Fourth Amendment as 
a protection of personal security as he wrote, “This inestimable right of personal security 
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 Another practical reason that law enforcement officers arrest people is 
because they get the benefit of the “free” or automatic search incident to 
arrest that has been discussed above.331  If they issue a summons or 
citation, they do not get to make the search.332  If there is no valid reason to 
make an arrest, it should not be permitted in order to enable the police to 
search.  The justification for a search incident to arrest presumes there is a 
valid reason to arrest in the first place.  There is no reasonable basis for 
subjecting an individual to an arrest and a subsequent search if there is no 
reason to arrest to begin with. 
 The final practical reason why law enforcement officers like to make 
arrests is that an arrest gives them an opportunity to engage in custodial 
interrogation.333  But like a search incident to arrest, custodial interrogation 
is another burden imposed upon an arrestee.  If an arrest is unwarranted, 
such an additional onus ought also to be regarded as unreasonable.334 
2. Arrests for Minor Offenses 
 Justice Stewart suggested in a concurring opinion in Gustafson v. 
Florida335 that a “persuasive claim might have been made in this case that 
the custodial arrest of the petitioner for a minor traffic offense violated his 
rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.”336  The Supreme 
Court rejected such a claim in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista.337 
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 Gail Atwater was driving her pickup truck in Lago Vista, Texas, when 
a police officer pulled her over after he saw her three-year-old son and five-
year-old daughter in the front seat not wearing seatbelts.338  The officer had 
stopped Atwater previously when he thought she had not belted in her son, 
but discovered that the child was in fact belted although in a position that 
Atwater conceded was unsafe.339  After the second stop, the officer called 
for backup and asked Atwater for her license and insurance 
documentation.340  She had none and explained that her purse had been 
stolen the day before.341  The officer arrested Atwater, handcuffed her, 
placed her in his patrol car, and drove her to the station house where she 
was booked and placed in a cell before being released by a magistrate on a 
$310 bond.342  Atwater pleaded no contest to a seatbelt violation charge and 
paid a $50 fine.343  She then filed a civil rights suit against the officer, the 
city, and the chief of police, claiming that the arrest was a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.344 
 After a district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, a 
panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, 
holding that “an arrest for a first-time seat belt offense” was an 
unreasonable seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.345  The 
en banc court reversed the panel and reinstated the summary judgment.346 
 The Supreme Court agreed with the en banc Fifth Circuit and rejected 
what Justice Souter characterized as “Atwater’s specific contention [] that 
‘founding-era common-law rules’ forbade peace officers to make 
warrantless misdemeanor arrests except in cases of ‘breach of the peace,’ a 
category she claims was then understood narrowly as covering only those 
nonfelony offenses ‘involving or tending toward violence.’”347  Justice 
Souter observed that 
Atwater has cited no particular evidence that those who framed 
and ratified the Fourth Amendment sought to limit peace officers’ 
warrantless misdemeanor arrest authority to instances of actual 
breach of the peace, and our own review of the recent and 
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respected compilations of framing-era documentary history has 
likewise failed to reveal any such design.348 
 Justice Souter recognized that, on the facts, the arrest of Atwater 
appeared unreasonable and somewhat vindictive: 
 If we were to derive a rule exclusively to address the 
uncontested facts of this case, Atwater might well prevail.  She 
was a known and established resident of Lago Vista with no place 
to hide and no incentive to flee, and common sense says she 
would almost certainly have buckled up as a condition of driving 
off with a citation.  In her case, the physical incidents of arrest 
were merely gratuitous humiliations imposed by a police officer 
who was (at best) exercising extremely poor judgment.349 
But Justice Souter then reasoned that any standard other than one 
permitting officers to arrest everyone at their discretion was unworkable: 
 One line . . . might be between ‘jailable’ and ‘fine-only’ 
offenses, between those for which conviction could result in 
commitment and those for which it could not.  The trouble with 
this distinction, of course, is that an officer on the street might not 
be able to tell.  It is not merely that we cannot expect every police 
officer to know the details of frequently complex penalty 
schemes, . . . but that penalties for ostensibly identical conduct can 
vary on account of facts difficult (if not impossible) to know at the 
scene of an arrest.  Is this the first offense or is the suspect a repeat 
offender?  Is the weight of the marijuana a gram above or a gram 
below the fine-only line?  Where conduct could implicate more 
than one criminal prohibition, which one will the district attorney 
ultimately decide to charge?  And so on.350 
 Despite this analysis, Justice Souter was able to come up with one 
simple rule, but ultimately rejected it: 
 One may ask, of course, why these difficulties may not be 
answered by a simple tie breaker for the police to follow in the 
field: if in doubt, do not arrest.  The first answer is that in practice 
the tie breaker would boil down to something akin to a least-
restrictive-alternative limitation, which is itself one of those “ifs, 
ands, and buts” rules, generally thought inappropriate in working 
out Fourth Amendment protection. . . .  Beyond that, whatever 
help the tie breaker might give would come at the price of a 
systematic disincentive to arrest in situations where even Atwater 
concedes that arresting would serve an important societal interest.  
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An officer not quite sure that the drugs weighed enough to warrant 
jail time or not quite certain about a suspect’s risk of flight would 
not arrest, even though it could perfectly well turn out that, in fact, 
the offense called for incarceration and the defendant was long 
gone on the day of trial.  Multiplied many times over, the costs to 
society of such underenforcement could easily outweigh the costs 
to defendants of being needlessly arrested and booked, as Atwater 
herself acknowledges.351 
 Justice Souter’s concern about Atwater’s particular facts was 
somewhat assuaged by his belief that there was “a dearth of horribles 
demanding redress.”352  This was evidenced by the fact that “when 
Atwater’s counsel was asked at oral argument for any indications of 
comparably foolish, warrantless misdemeanor arrests, he could offer only 
one.”353 
 Justice Souter clearly minimized the importance of the personal and 
emotional consequences of being arrested: 
Atwater’s arrest was surely “humiliating,” as she says in her brief, 
but it was no more “harmful to . . . privacy or . . . physical 
interests” than the normal custodial arrest.  She was handcuffed, 
placed in a squad car, and taken to the local police station, where 
officers asked her to remove her shoes, jewelry, and glasses, and 
to empty her pockets.  They then took her photograph and placed 
her in a cell, alone, for about an hour, after which she was taken 
before a magistrate, and released on $310 bond.  The arrest and 
booking were inconvenient and embarrassing to Atwater, but not 
so extraordinary as to violate the Fourth Amendment.354 
As lawyers and family members who visit persons who have been arrested 
are quick to realize, to say that a particular arrest was “no more harmful to 
privacy or physical interests” than the normal arrest is to ignore the harm 
that often occurs from such arrests.  Not everyone is kept alone in a cell, 
and not everyone gets out in an hour.  Fear of physical and sexual assault is 
often real and sadly warranted.  The notion that because all custodial arrests 
are potentially dangerous, we should not worry about any of them reflects a 
failure to appreciate what it is like to be arrested. 
 Justice Souter completely failed to offer any genuine reason why 
arrests are needed in a host of cases.  His argument that lines may be 
difficult to draw ultimately is unpersuasive.  His “ifs, ands, and buts” 
analysis came from Belton,355 and we have seen that the problem with 
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Belton is simply that it is unprincipled.356 
 Furthermore, Justice Souter’s opinion seemed to assume that if the 
Court announced a principle—e.g., that an arrest may only be made where 
an individual poses a danger to society or is at risk of not appearing in court 
if a summons or citation is issued357—police officers would be unable to 
enforce such a rule.  There is, however, every reason to think otherwise.  
Legislatures could act to identify dangerous offenses for which arrests are 
always deemed proper, and courts could give appropriate deference to such 
judgments.  Moreover, officers now make these judgments, but they do so 
without any constitutional principle to guide them—i.e., every time police 
officers have authority to decide whether to arrest or issue a summons, they 
make the very judgment that Justice Souter concludes they cannot make. 
 In effect, the Atwater Court sanctioned arrests made with questionable 
motives.  For the majority, it was acceptable for an officer to make an 
arrest of a person whom the officer knows could only be fined, thereby 
punishing the person with imprisonment.  It was also permissible to arrest a 
person solely for the purpose of making an otherwise impermissible search 
incident to arrest,358 or to assure an opportunity for custodial interrogation 
that would not otherwise exist.  As noted earlier, the Court ought to forbid 
these purposes, and limiting the number of arrests is the only way to 
accomplish this. 
 Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined Justice O’Connor’s 
dissent.359  Justice O’Connor identified the harms associated with arrest 
more clearly than did Justice Souter,360 and she limited her preferred rule to 
fine-only offenses: 
In light of the availability of citations to promote a State’s 
interests when a fine-only offense has been committed, I cannot 
concur in a rule which deems a full custodial arrest to be 
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reasonable in every circumstance.  Giving police officers 
constitutional carte blanche to effect an arrest whenever there is 
probable cause to believe a fine-only misdemeanor has been 
committed is irreconcilable with the Fourth Amendment’s 
command that seizures be reasonable.  Instead, I would require 
that when there is probable cause to believe that a fine-only 
offense has been committed, the police officer should issue a 
citation unless the officer is “able to point to specific and 
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences 
from those facts, reasonably warrant [the additional] intrusion” of 
a full custodial arrest.361 
Justice O’Connor also argued that the doctrine of qualified immunity 
would protect officers from liability for making reasonable judgments at 
the time of arrest that a court later deemed wrong.362  Qualified immunity 
would thus assure that there were no undue disincentives to arresting those 
for whom a legitimate reason existed to arrest.363 
 Law enforcement officers are called upon to make judgments all the 
time.  They must decide whether they have reasonable suspicion or 
probable cause, and whether an exigency exists that justifies a search 
without a warrant.  The rule is that courts will not condemn a judgment of 
an officer as long as it is reasonable.  The court need not agree with the 
officer; it is sufficient that the court finds that the officer acted within the 
ballpark of reasonableness. 
 The Atwater Court could have built upon this deference to police and 
simultaneously imposed a principled limit on the power to arrest.  It could 
have held that officers may arrest when they have a reasonable basis to 
conclude that a suspect poses a risk to the community or a risk of 
nonappearance.  It could have added that violent acts presumptively 
involve risk to the community; that drug offenses, because of the potential 
penalties involved, presumptively pose a risk of flight; and that courts 
should give deference to legislative judgments mandating arrests under 
certain circumstances.  Finally, the Court could have clearly stated that an 
officer who is deciding whether or not to make an arrest may check for 
outstanding warrants before deciding to issue a citation in order to assure 
that dangerous individuals are not inadvertently released.  There was no 
need to limit restrictions on arrest to fine-only situations, as Justice 
O’Connor’s dissent would have done.  The limit could easily have 
extended to all minor offenses and offenders where there is no apparent 
danger or likelihood of flight.  Instead, the Court permitted law 
enforcement officers to continue to act arbitrarily, punitively, and 
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unnecessarily—to engage in totally unprincipled behavior.  The alternative 
was to adopt a principle and trust law enforcement to apply it reasonably. 
 Similarly, when arrest warrants are sought, there is no reason why 
magistrates should not be required to decide whether an arrest is 
appropriate or whether a summons would suffice.  Rules like Federal Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 4(a), which permits a prosecutor to compel the 
issuance of an arrest warrant whenever there is probable cause, are 
overbroad.  The prosecutor ought to have to state reasons why he believes 
an arrest is required.  Because it is the magistrates who determine whether 
to release arrestees and on what conditions, they surely have the capacity to 
determine whether people should be arrested in the first place.364 
 In his majority opinion, Justice Souter relied on the failure of 
Atwater’s counsel to cite more than one other case in which police conduct 
was as offensive as in the Atwater case.365  His conclusion that there was a 
“dearth of horribles”366 is surprising, if not amazing.  After all, the Supreme 
Court itself invited offensive conduct and placed its imprimatur on it in 
Whren v. United States.367  In Whren, plainclothes officers of the District of 
Columbia Metropolitan Police Department patrolled, in an unmarked car, a 
“high drug area” and became suspicious of several youths occupying a 
Pathfinder truck with temporary license plates waiting at a stop sign.368  
The only suspicious act that the Court described, other than the 
automobile’s presence in a “high drug area,” was that the driver was 
looking down into the lap of the passenger at his right while remaining 
stopped at the stop sign for more than twenty seconds.369  When the police 
car turned around to head back toward the truck, the truck turned suddenly, 
without signaling, and drove away at an “unreasonable” speed.370  The 
police pursued and were able to approach the Pathfinder when it stopped at 
a red light.371 
 District of Columbia police regulations prohibited the officers from 
enforcing traffic laws generally.372  Plainclothes officers were permitted to 
enforce traffic laws “only in the case of a violation that is so grave as to 
pose an immediate threat to the safety of others.”373  It was clear, therefore, 
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that the officers in Whren were not entrusted with responsibility for 
ordinary driving infractions; they were generally prohibited from policing 
such infractions.  Nevertheless, the officers concluded that they had 
probable cause to arrest the driver of the car for making a turn without 
signaling properly and for driving at an unreasonable speed (which 
presumably is not the same as exceeding the speed limit).374  A unanimous 
Court in Whren rejected the argument that the stop was a pretext and that 
an officer’s subjective intent should govern rather than an objective 
assessment of reasonableness.375 
 Whren did not specifically address the question finally reached in 
Atwater, but it certainly foreshadowed the Atwater decision.  Justice Scalia 
wrote for the unanimous Court: 
Petitioners urge as an extraordinary factor in this case that the 
“multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations” is so 
large and so difficult to obey perfectly that virtually everyone is 
guilty of violation, permitting the police to single out almost 
whomever they wish for a stop.  But we are aware of no principle 
that would allow us to decide at what point a code of law becomes 
so expansive and so commonly violated that infraction itself can 
no longer be the ordinary measure of the lawfulness of 
enforcement.  And even if we could identify such exorbitant 
codes, we do not know by what standard (or what right) we would 
decide, as petitioners would have us do, which particular 
provisions are sufficiently important to merit enforcement.376 
This may have been dictum, but it also was a strong statement that the 
Court was not going to distinguish between types of offenses in assessing 
the legitimacy of police practices. 
 Even if the Whren Court was correct in holding that police conduct 
should be viewed by an objective standard, a reasonable objective standard 
could place limits on the right to arrest.  In Whren, the police saw drugs as 
they approached the car.377  Thus, they did not have to arrest for the traffic 
violations in order to justify a search of the car.  But Atwater and Whren 
clearly empower police departments to direct officers who see any traffic 
violation for which an arrest can be made, no matter how minor, to arrest 
the driver for the specific purpose of searching the car, even though the 
officer lacks reasonable suspicion that the car contains contraband or 
evidence of a crime.  That is what the officers were prepared to do in 
Whren.  That is what officers do throughout the country now that they have 
been given permission by the Supreme Court. 
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 The reason that Justice Souter found a “dearth of horribles” is that, 
although the Court expressed concern for the specific treatment of Gail 
Atwater, it has demonstrated indifference to the use of the power to arrest 
in other settings.  For more than thirty years, it has empowered the police to 
arrest for minor offenses and to subsequently search incident to an arrest.378  
Now it has made clear that there is no offense so minor that arrest is a 
constitutionally impermissible response to a violation. 
 Whren might well be a sound decision, but it greatly increased the 
need for the Supreme Court to impose a limit on the power to arrest.  The 
problem is not that law enforcement officers use the power given to them.  
The problem is that the power to arrest ought to be subject to the 
reasonableness restriction of the Fourth Amendment. 
3. The Warrant Requirement 
a. The Basic Rule 
 Despite the Supreme Court’s assumption that warrantless searches and 
seizures are presumptively bad, the most common warrantless police 
activity is a warrantless arrest.  In many, if not most instances, warrantless 
arrests are easily justified because exigent circumstances exist.  When law 
enforcement officers encounter people who are engaged in criminal 
activity, about to engage in such activity, or are fleeing the scene of such 
activity, it would make little sense to require police to get warrants to 
apprehend these individuals.  The question is not whether the police should 
act; society demands that they act.  The question is whether the police 
should arrest. 
 Even though the vast bulk of arrests occur as police react to events 
they could not fully anticipate, there are situations in which investigations 
occur over time, law enforcement officers identify suspects well in advance 
of arrest, there is sufficient time to obtain a warrant for arrest, and there is 
no appreciable danger of destruction of evidence or escape while a warrant 
is sought.  Even in these cases, as a result of its decision in United States v. 
Watson,379 the Supreme Court does not require a warrant.380  Ironically, like 
New York v. Belton,381 Watson invoked a doctrine that was unnecessary to 
decide the case. 
 In Watson, Khoury, an informant, told a postal inspector that Watson 
possessed a stolen credit card, and later delivered the card to the 
 
 378 See, e.g., Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266 (1973) (holding that the arrest 
and subsequent search of a driver for not having his driver’s license was constitutionally 
permissible). 
 379 United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976). 
 380 Id. at 423–24. 
 381 See supra text accompanying notes 186–200. 
  
1764 The George Washington Law Review [Vol. 74:1702 
inspector.382  Khoury had been a reliable informant in the past, and his tip 
could have supported an arrest warrant.383  The inspector, however, learned 
that Watson had agreed to supply additional cards and wanted to gather all 
possible evidence regarding Watson’s illegal activity.384  Khoury agreed to 
cooperate and arranged to meet with Watson.385  The two met in a 
restaurant, where Khoury signaled to officers that Watson had the cards 
with him; the officers closed in and arrested Watson.386  A search incident 
to the arrest revealed that he had no stolen cards, but after Watson agreed to 
a search of his car, officers found two more stolen cards under a floor 
mat.387 
 The officers had probable cause to arrest Watson as a result of 
Khoury’s past track record, tip in the case, and signal.388  Had Khoury not 
given the signal, an arrest probably would not have been made.  When the 
officers got the signal, they judged that they had probable cause.389  They 
were not about to let Watson leave with the stolen cards, and thus the 
warrantless arrest was a typical arrest made for a crime in progress.390 
 Despite the fact that the warrantless arrest was justifiable as an 
exigent-circumstance arrest, Justice White’s opinion for the Court 
addressed the general question of whether an arrest for a felony may be 
made without a warrant regardless of the circumstances.391  He concluded 
that it could.392  His majority opinion and Justice Marshall’s dissent dueled 
over the meaning of the history of warrantless arrests.393  The majority and 
the dissent agreed on the common law rule: “[A] peace officer was 
permitted to arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor or felony 
committed in his presence as well as for a felony not committed in his 
presence if there was reasonable ground for making the arrest.”394  The 
disagreement came over how to phrase the question.  For the majority, the 
question was whether warrantless felony arrests were historically 
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permitted.395  For the dissent, the question was whether warrantless arrests 
for crimes that today are classified as felonies were historically 
permitted.396  The answer by the majority to its question was “yes,” and the 
dissent did not quarrel with that.397  The answer to the dissent’s question 
was “no,” and the majority did not quarrel with that.398 
 The Court might have discussed why the common-law rule permitted 
warrantless arrests, but it did not.  Had it done so, it would have recognized 
that at common law, “[n]o crime was considered a felony which did not 
occasion a total forfeiture of the offender’s lands, or goods, or both,” and 
therefore the term “felony” was limited to a few of the most serious 
crimes.399  A suspect had substantial reason to flee, police forces of the type 
that now exist throughout the United States did not exist then, and 
immediately apprehending the most dangerous suspects when they were 
found was thought to be reasonable.  Given the number of felonies set forth 
in modern criminal codes and the range of penalties, the need to arrest all 
suspects in felony cases without warrants is not as apparent as it was at 
common law.  Moreover, the Court’s preference for warrants was not 
firmed up until decisions like Chimel,400 which preceded Watson by only a 
few years. 
 Justice Powell’s concurring opinion in Watson was the only opinion to 
address whether there is any good reason to excuse not obtaining a warrant 
when no exigent circumstances exist.401  He recognized that the Court’s 
decisions created an anomaly, i.e., that people get less protection than 
property: 
 Since the Fourth Amendment speaks equally to both searches 
and seizures, and since an arrest, the taking hold of one’s person, 
is quintessentially a seizure, it would seem that the constitutional 
provision should impose the same limitations upon arrests that it 
does upon searches.  Indeed, as an abstract matter an argument 
can be made that the restrictions upon arrest perhaps should be 
greater.  A search may cause only annoyance and temporary 
inconvenience to the law-abiding citizen, assuming more serious 
dimension only when it turns up evidence of criminality.  An 
arrest, however, is a serious personal intrusion regardless of 
whether the person seized is guilty or innocent.  Although an 
arrestee cannot be held for a significant period without some 
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neutral determination that there are grounds to do so, no decision 
that he should go free can come quickly enough to erase the 
invasion of his privacy that already will have occurred.402 
Despite the power of this analysis, Justice Powell added that “logic 
sometimes must defer to history and experience.”403  It would seem, 
however, that logic should defer to history and experience only if those two 
elements provide an adequate reason for deference.404  Justice Powell 
offered only this: 
Good police practice often requires postponing an arrest, even 
after probable cause has been established, in order to place the 
suspect under surveillance or otherwise develop further evidence 
necessary to prove guilt to a jury.  Under the holding of the Court 
of Appeals such additional investigative work could imperil the 
entire prosecution.  Should the officers fail to obtain a warrant 
initially, and later be required by unforeseen circumstances to 
arrest immediately with no chance to procure a last-minute 
warrant, they would risk a court decision that the subsequent 
exigency did not excuse their failure to get a warrant in the interim 
since they first developed probable cause.  If the officers 
attempted to meet such a contingency by procuring a warrant as 
soon as they had probable cause and then merely held it during 
their subsequent investigation, they would risk a court decision 
that the warrant had grown stale by the time it was used.405 
 This reasoning is flawed.  If law enforcement officers have probable 
cause to believe that a suspect committed a crime for which an arrest is 
warranted, and there are no exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless 
arrest, then there is no reason that they should not obtain an arrest warrant.  
If they are involved in an investigation that makes it impractical to obtain a 
warrant, because they would have to leave the investigation scene, exigent 
 
 402 Id. at 428 (citation omitted). 
 403 Id. at 429. 
 404 Justice Powell opined that “the prior decisions of the Court have assumed the 
validity of such [warrantless] arrests without addressing in a reasoned way the analysis 
advanced by respondent.”  Id. at 426.  He attempted to provide some reason why warrantless 
arrests absent exigent circumstances made sense. 
  In Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), the Court rejected both history and 
experience as it held that the common law rule that law enforcement officers could use 
deadly force to prevent a felon from fleeing was invalid under the Fourth Amendment.  Id. 
at 3.  Justice White, the author of the Court’s opinion in Watson, also wrote the majority 
opinion in Garner and reasoned that “[b]ecause of sweeping change in the legal and 
technological context, reliance on the common-law rule in this case would be a mistaken 
literalism that ignores the purposes of a historical inquiry.”  Id. at 13.  This is akin to the 
argument made by the dissenters in Watson.  See Watson, 423 U.S. at 439–42 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
 405 Watson, 423 U.S. at 431–32 (Powell, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). 
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circumstances would exist to excuse the warrant requirement.  Once a 
warrant is obtained, it is the rarest of cases in which probable cause 
disappears.  Indeed, it is difficult to understand how the facts leading to 
probable cause could ever become stale.  Officers might learn that there is 
an innocent and true explanation for facts that seemed damning when a 
warrant was obtained.  In such a case, they ought to seek withdrawal of the 
warrant.  But unlike search warrants, which can become stale because 
property may be moved or disposed of, arrest warrants, once issued, will 
remain valid virtually forever. 
 Moreover, officers still have the option of continuing the investigation 
of a suspect, even though they already have probable cause to arrest him, in 
the hope of discovering additional crimes or criminals; if they are 
successful, as the police were in Watson, they will be permitted to arrest the 
suspect(s) without a warrant for the additional crimes.  In short, none of 
Justice Powell’s concerns support the distinction between warrants for 
searches of property and warrantless arrests of individuals. 
b. The Twists on the Basic Rule 
 After deciding Watson, the Court developed a series of confusing rules 
for arrests in the home.  In Payton v. New York,406 the Court held that, 
absent exigent circumstances, police may not enter a suspect’s home to 
arrest the suspect without an arrest warrant or a search warrant.407  Police 
with a search warrant may enter at any time to search the premises.  Police 
with an arrest warrant may only enter “when there is reason to believe the 
suspect is within.”408  Payton thus placed the burden on lower courts to 
decide whether arrests take place within the home or without.409 
 After Payton, the Court held in Steagald v. United States410 that absent 
exigent circumstances, a search warrant rather than an arrest warrant was 
required to enter the home of a third party to arrest a suspect inside the 
home.411  The Court was concerned that, absent a search warrant 
requirement, “[a]rmed solely with an arrest warrant for a single person, the 
police could search all the homes of that individual’s friends and 
acquaintances.”412  Payton and Steagald required the police to know 
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 407 Id. at 576. 
 408 Id. at 603. 
 409 See, e.g., United States v. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d 1423, 1427 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding 
that no arrest warrant was required where the defendant voluntarily opened his door and 
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 410 Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981). 
 411 Id. at 205–06. 
 412 Id. at 215. 
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exactly whose house they were entering to make an arrest.  If it was the 
suspect’s own house (or one shared by the suspect with others), an arrest 
warrant was sufficient.  If it was a third party’s house, a search warrant was 
required. 
 What if the suspect were temporarily sharing a house?  The answer to 
that question came in Minnesota v. Olson,413 where the Court held that an 
arrest warrant was required under Payton to arrest an overnight guest in the 
home of a third person.414  The State argued that no warrant was needed to 
arrest Olson because an overnight guest has no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the guest home—the Court flatly rejected this argument.415 
 Although the Court rejected the State’s argument that no warrant was 
required, it failed to explain why a search warrant was not required to enter 
the home to arrest Olson, as Steagald would seem to require.416  The 
answer almost certainly is that Olson, although a temporary guest, was not 
the intended beneficiary of the Steagald rule.  Steagald protects the owner 
of the home, not the guest.417  If the police enter a third party’s home 
without a search warrant, the owner can complain, but the temporary guest 
cannot.  If, however, the temporary guest is treated as though he has a 
protected interest in the home, as Olson was treated, the temporary guest 
can object to entry without the arrest warrant required by Payton.418 
 What if a person is not an overnight guest, but is visiting and taking an 
afternoon nap?  Is an arrest warrant required to enter the house?  How 
could the police know whether or not the person was napping, or how long 
the person intended to stay?  How could the police know that a suspect had 
stayed overnight or was planning to stay for the night?  The reality is that 
the police generally have no way of knowing how long a suspect is going 
to stay in a particular place. 
 The Court confirmed its reasonable expectation of privacy rule set 
down in Olson in its decision in Minnesota v. Carter.419  The Court in 
Carter held that two men who were cutting up cocaine in an apartment had 
no standing to object to a warrantless search because they had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises.420 
 These decisions must be confusing to police.  They have to know what 
a suspect’s relationship is to a house in order to know whether a warrant is 
required, and if so, what kind of warrant is required to enter in order to 
make an arrest without violating someone’s constitutional rights.  It is often 
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difficult for the police simply to locate a suspect.  When they finally do, 
determining what role the suspect is playing vis-à-vis a particular premises 
may be quite burdensome. 
c. A Better Way 
 The underlying problem that gives rise to these confusing holdings is 
that the power to arrest is not limited to suspects who pose a danger to 
society.  If it were so limited, a strong case could be made that in order to 
make an arrest, with or without a warrant, officers should be able to enter a 
home when they have probable cause that the suspect is inside.  If arrests 
were confined to persons who posed a danger to the community or of 
flight, there is a strong case to be made that exigent circumstances exist to 
arrest those persons immediately. 
 There is a trade-off: fewer people would be arrested if the Court 
limited the power to arrest for minor crimes, but more people would be 
arrested in their homes without warrants if the Court viewed the discovery 
of those subject to arrest as a per se exigent circumstance justifying 
immediate action. 
D. Searches 
 The Supreme Court could make Fourth Amendment rules regarding 
searches much simpler if it adopted three straightforward principles: 
1. Chimel governs searches incident to arrest in all settings, and 
Belton is no longer good law.421 
2. Law enforcement officers who want to search property 
generally must obtain a warrant. 
3. If, however, exigent circumstances exist such that property may 
be destroyed, cause damage, or disappear while a warrant is 
sought, officers may seize, detain, or restrain the property while a 
warrant is sought or may conduct an immediate search if it is not 
practicable to obtain a warrant, but must seek a warrant to 
continue a search once the exigency disappears. 
 These three principles would give the Warrant Clause the deference 
the Court said it deserves, guide law enforcement officers by providing 
principles for action, and obviate the need for arbitrary rules like the 
automobile exception and Belton.  These principles are consistent with 
decisions the Court has made regarding murder scenes,422 fire scenes,423 
 
 421 See supra text accompanying notes 173–179; supra text accompanying notes 186–
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 422 See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978) (holding that a warrantless search 
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and drug scenes.424  These principles would provide guidance to govern the 
basic enforcement of criminal law.  They would not necessarily control the 
myriad of other government activities that are covered by the Fourth 
Amendment. 
 One additional principle would also be helpful.  This principle would 
recognize that when police conduct health and safety inspections to enforce 
various administrative schemes, a warrant should be required to search 
individuals or places unless there is consent to search.  There is no reason 
for the Court to continue to vacillate on the issue of whether a warrant is 
required for administrative searches.425  Assuming the government has a 
reasonable health and safety plan, an administrative judge or other judge 
should be required to approve the plan and issue warrants implementing the 
plan.  The warrants could be sought in advance of any searches, so surprise 
would still be possible if it was an important part of the government 
scheme.  Furthermore, if the Court treated drug testing as a health and 
safety search, it could avoid the arbitrariness of the “special needs” cases 
and bring drug testing into the mainstream of administrative searches.426 
 In short, implementing this set of principles would help the Court to 
avoid continuing to develop a broad and confusing landscape of 
unprincipled bright line rules and exceptions thereto regarding searches.  
Such a principled approach would greatly assist law enforcement officers 
to do their jobs better and would ensure that dangerous criminals are not 
freed on technicalities that result from misinterpretations of these complex 
and arbitrary rules. 
Conclusion 
 The arbitrariness of the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment cases did 
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2006] The Fourth Amendment: Code or Body of Principles? 1771 
not begin with the Rehnquist Court.  Doctrines like the automobile 
exception have deep roots in the decisions of earlier Courts.  But the 
Rehnquist Court, like its predecessors, tended to adopt bright line rules that 
were neither needed by law enforcement nor likely to make it easier for law 
enforcement to deal with changing facts. 
 Law enforcement officers benefit more from an understanding of the 
principles that are derived from the Fourth Amendment than from arbitrary, 
bright line rules.  Once they understand principles, they can apply those 
principles to changing facts. 
 I have sought to demonstrate how inconsistent and unpersuasive the 
Court’s decisions have been over many years in a number of Fourth 
Amendment settings, and to suggest principles which, if adopted, would 
simplify the law, make it more understandable, and better protect both 
people and property. 
 The Rehnquist Court was satisfied with the rules it inherited, and 
generally built upon them.  The end result of having more decisions piled 
on those that came before is that Fourth Amendment law resembles the 
Internal Revenue Code in its complexity.  It need not.  A principled 
approach to the Fourth Amendment remains an option. 
 
